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Mining is a key driver of Australian economic development, particularly in 
resource-rich Western Australia. Ensuring adequate rehabilitation of mine sites 
after the completion of mining has been an ongoing challenge for Australia’s 
states and territories. Mining securities and financial assurance frameworks have 
sought to achieve compliance in this area through a combination of the use of 
performance bonds, inspection and monitoring, and societal pressure.  
Outcomes have been mixed at best, and Western Australia has a significant 
legacy of abandoned mine sites, which represent a substantial potential liability 
for the State. To address these issues, the Western Australian state government 
introduced a new mining securities system, the Mining Rehabilitation Fund, 
which commenced in 2013. 
This thesis analyses the objectives and the impacts of the Mining Rehabilitation 
Fund in Western Australia. It does so using an empirical approach based on 
interviews with lawyers with experience in the application of the Mining 
Rehabilitation Fund, and aims to advance understanding of the Mining 
Rehabilitation Fund by comparing their experiences against theoretical analyses 
on mining securities to date. It also considers concerns raised by interviewees 
about mining securities within the wider framework.  
This thesis suggests that, while in its early stages, the Mining Rehabilitation Fund 
has been successful in establishing a pooled fund to address the issues of 
abandoned mine sites and legacy mine rehabilitation. It has achieved this without 
placing an unreasonable financial or administrative burden on the industry.  
However, the Mining Rehabilitation Fund’s effectiveness is reduced by the 
ongoing exclusion of State Agreement mines. The Mining Rehabilitation Fund 
also provides little incentive to undertake progressive rehabilitation for mine 
operators. The risks to the State in instances of operator insolvency appear to have 
increased, and therefore the State may have acted too rapidly in returning most of 
the performance bonds, at least before completion of a transitional period. 
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I    INTRODUCTION 
A    Mining in Western Australia 
Western Australia (‘WA’) has immense natural resources, including world-class 
mineral deposits. The rapid growth of the mining industry has contributed to the 
economic development and prosperity of the State, and the financial health of the 
State government. 1  The industry’s contribution is recognised in State policy 
promoting and attracting mining investment in the State.2  
Whilst the financial and economic benefits of mining are apparent, poorly 
conducted or regulated mining can result in risk to State finances or the 
environment, 3  which may compromise the industry’s sustainability. 4  Shifting 
community expectations on environmental matters, the growing recognition of the 
abandoned mine problem,5 and the resulting potential financial liability for the 
State,6 have led to increased media and public scrutiny.7 
Therefore, a tension exists between the need to promote mining, and the need to 
achieve positive environmental outcomes for the State and community. This has 
caused increased policy focus on these competing objectives throughout Australia 
in the form of state parliamentary hearings,8 government reports on the adequacy 
                                                 
1  The WA State government received royalty income of $4.6 billion representing approximately 
20 per cent of total WA State revenue in 2016-17: Department of Treasury (WA), 2016-17 
Annual Report on State Finances (2017) 28. 
2  Department of Premier and Cabinet, ‘New mining legislation to cut costs’ (Media Statement, 
30 October 2013). 
3  Auditor General Western Australia, Ensuring Compliance with Conditions on Mining, Report 
8 (2011) 5. 
4  Martin Brueckner et al, ‘The mining boom and Western Australia’s changing landscape: 
Towards sustainability or business as usual?’ (2013) 22(2) Rural Society 111, 114. 
5  Ginny Stein, ‘Mining report finds 60,000 abandoned sites, lack of rehabilitation and unreliable 
data’, ABC (online), 15 February 2017 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-02-15/australia-
institute-report-raises-concerns-on-mine-rehab/8270558>. 
6  Auditor General Western Australia, above n 3, 5. 
7  Peter Hannam, ‘NSW mine rehabilitation funds inadequate and outcomes vague: Auditor-
General’, Sydney Morning Herald (online), 11 May 2017 
<http://www.smh.com.au/environment/nsw-mine-rehabilitation-funds-inadequate-and-
outcomes-vague-auditorgeneral-20170511-gw2nc4.html>; Kathleen Calderwood, ‘Queensland 
environment at risk unnecessarily says report’, ABC (online), 7 April 2014 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/rural/2014-04-03/ehp-audit/5365540>. 
8  Lachlan Bennett, ‘Parliamentary committee hearing into the rehabilitation of mining and 




of financial assurance and compliance monitoring,9 and a Senate Inquiry into the 
rehabilitation of Australia’s abandoned mines.10 
B    Mine Rehabilitation 
In recent years, following a decade of unprecedented mining industry growth, 
declining investment and fluctuating commodity prices have occasioned a 
slowdown in the WA economy.11 This period saw declining state revenue,12 an 
upsurge in mine closures,13 and companies entering administration or liquidation, 
with subsequent mine abandonments, 14  leading to increased scrutiny on the 
adequacy of the State’s financial assurance regime.15 
WA’s extensive history of mining development has left a legacy of widespread 
un-rehabilitated abandoned mine sites, and represent a ‘social, environmental and 
financial challenge’ 16  for the State. There has been increased concern about 
                                                                                                                                     
Eric Barker and Charlie McKillop, ‘Abandoned mines: Expert calls for national plan at Senate 
inquiry’, ABC (online), 1 August 2017 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/rural/2017-08-01/calls-
for-national-approach-to-abandoned-mine-rehabilitation/8763538>. 
9  Queensland Audit Office, Environmental regulation of the resources and waste industries, 
Report No 15 (2013); Audit Office of New South Wales, Mining Rehabilitation Security 
Deposits (2017). 
10  Parliament of Australia, Rehabilitation of mining and resources projects as it relates to 
Commonwealth responsibilities (2017) 
<https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Environment_and_Com
munications/MiningandResources>.  
11  Department of Treasury (WA), The Structure of the Western Australian Economy (2014) 61; 
Department of Jobs, Tourism, Science and Innovation (WA), Economy 
<http://www.jtsi.wa.gov.au/about-the-state/quality-of-life/economy>. 
12  The mining industry’s contribution to State revenue in the last financial year represented a 
decline of 21.2 per cent on 2014-15: Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), Statistics 
Digest 2015-16 (2016) 18. 
13  Joanna Prendergast, ‘Sinosteel iron ore mine closure fuels unease in WA Mid West 
communities’, ABC Rural (online), 15 April 2015 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/rural/2015-04-
15/sino-closure-fuels-regional-wa-fear/6394768>; Natalie Jones, ‘Kimberley economy hit hard 
by mining slump as major projects sit idle’, ABC (online), 21 March 2016 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-03-20/kimberley-economy-hit-hard-by-mining-
slump/7259748>.  
14  Sam Tomlin, ‘Pilot clean-up program hailed as answer to Western Australia's abandoned 
mines’, ABC (online), 22 March 2017 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-03-22/wa-
government-hails-pilot-mine-clean-up-program-a-success/8373114>. 
15  Emma McLeod, ‘Who is going to be left with the cleaning bill? Mine site rehabilitation and 
regulatory responses to abandoned sites’ (Paper presented at the Fortieth Annual Conference 
of AMPLA Limited, 12-14 October 2016). 
16  Angus Morrison-Saunders and Jenny Pope, ‘Mine closure planning and social responsibility in 
Western Australia: Recent policy innovations’ (Paper presented at the SRMining 2013: 2nd 




instances of operators engaging in strategies to avoid or postpone their 
rehabilitation obligations, resulting in their eventual reversion to the State. 17 
Concerns about the level of financial risk to the State, and the inadequacy of 
Unconditional Performance Bonds (‘UPBs’) as a financial assurance mechanism 
have led to major reform of the WA mining securities system.  
The introduction of the Mining Rehabilitation Fund (‘MRF’ or ‘Fund’), which 
became effective from 1 July 2013, and mandatory from 1 July 2014,18 was an 
outcome of an extensive public consultation with industry stakeholders. 19 
Established by the Mining Rehabilitation Fund Act 2012 (WA), the MRF largely 
replaced UPBs as the State’s key mechanism to achieve financial assurance over 
rehabilitation obligations. It established a ‘government-administered, pooled 
fund’,20 to provide the State with improved financial assurance in relation to mine 
abandonments, and to address the issue of historical abandoned mines (‘legacy 
sites’).21  
C    Purpose of Research 
Since the MRF has now been in operation for over three years, it appears 
appropriate to evaluate its perceived effects. This thesis examines the effects of 
the implementation of the MRF, from the perspective of mining or environmental 
lawyers in WA, who have direct experience of the MRF, and will utilise their 
observations to assess whether it has met its objectives as a mining security 
system.22  
Mining securities are an issue which state and territory governments have been 
grappling to resolve.23 Academics and governments have widely examined the 
                                                 
17  Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), Policy Options for Mining Securities in Western 
Australia, Preliminary Discussion Paper (2010) III. 
18  Western Australia, Western Australian Government Gazette, No 96, 21 June 2013, 2445. 
19  Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), above n 17. 
20  Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), Mining Rehabilitation Fund – Guidance (2017) 2. 
21  Department of Premier and Cabinet (WA), ‘State’s mine bonds system gets overhaul’ (Media 
Statement, 15 August 2012). 
22  See below Chapter II(A)(4) and Appendix A for a discussion of these objectives. 
23  Queensland Audit Office, Environmental regulation of the resources and waste industries, 
Report No 15 (2013); Audit Office of New South Wales, Mining Rehabilitation Security 
Deposits: Department of Planning and Environment (2017); Nicole Asher, ‘Hazelwood coal 
mine rehabilitation will face significant and unprecedented challenges’, ABC (online), 7 
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effectiveness of various financial assurance regimes, 24  with previous research 
focusing on a theoretical analysis of the MRF, 25 or comparative analysis with 
similar pooled funds, relative to UPB requirements in other jurisdictions.26  
The MRF has been acclaimed as an innovative policy,27 and has been examined 
as a possible mining securities system in other jurisdictions, including Africa.28 
While supporting the purpose for the introduction of the MRF, others have 
criticised the immediate release of bonds, preferring a hybrid mining securities 
system.29 
Instead of a further theoretical analysis, this thesis utilises an empirical research 
approach to consider the practical implications of the MRF from the perspective 
of senior lawyers who have experience with its implementation, either in practice, 
government, or working in the industry.30 In doing so, this thesis aims to provide 
insight into the practical benefits and challenges that lawyers, and their clients 
have experienced following the introduction of the MRF. 
                                                                                                                                     
November 2016, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-11-07/expert-warns-of-hazelwood-
rehabilitation-challenges/8001284>. 
24  Natalie Sommer and Alex Gardner, ‘Environmental Securities in the Mining Industry: A Legal 
Framework for Western Australia’ (2012) 31(3) Australian Resources and Energy Law 
Journal 242; Emma McLeod, ‘Who is going to be left with the cleaning bill? Mine site 
rehabilitation and regulatory responses to abandoned sites’ (Paper presented at the Fortieth 
Annual Conference of AMPLA Limited, 12-14 October 2016); Queensland Audit Office, 
Environmental regulation of the resources and waste industries, Report No 15 (2013); Audit 
Office of New South Wales, Mining Rehabilitation Security Deposits: Department of Planning 
and Environment (2017); Louisa Rebgetz, ‘Adani Carmichael mine's rehabilitation financial 
assurance at least $1.5b, Lock the Gate says’, ABC (online), 24 May 2017 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-05-24/adani-carmichael-mine-rehab-finance-assurance-at-
least-$1.5b/8554018>. 
25  Natalie Sommer and Alex Gardner, ‘Environmental Securities in the Mining Industry: A Legal 
Framework for Western Australia’ (2012) 31(3) Australian Resources and Energy Law 
Journal 242. 
26  Emma McLeod, ‘Who is going to be left with the cleaning bill? Mine site rehabilitation and 
regulatory responses to abandoned sites’ (Paper presented at the Fortieth Annual Conference 
of AMPLA Limited, 12-14 October 2016). 
27  Department of Premier and Cabinet (WA), ‘Innovative fund lifts mine rehabilitation rate’ 
(Media Statement, 19 July 2015); Fraser Institute, Fraser Institute’s Annual Survey of Mining 
Companies: 2015 (8 June 2016) <http://www.fraserinstitute.org/studies/annual-survey-of-
mining-companies-2015>. 
28  Angus Morrison-Saunders et al, ‘Integrating mine closure planning with environmental impact 
assessment: challenges and opportunities drawn from African and Australian practice’ (2016) 
34(2) Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal 117. 
29  Sommer and Gardner, above n 25, 252. 
30  See below Chapter III. 
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D    Results 
The interviewees identified the primary objective of the MRF as the 
establishment of a fund to address abandoned and legacy mine sites, without 
imposing an unreasonable burden on the mining industry, consistent with the 
legislative and policy objectives. The results indicate that interviewees perceived 
the MRF as successful in meeting this objective, although it was recognised that it 
would take some years for the full benefit of the MRF to be experienced. 
While the level of financial assurance held by the State was considered to have 
been improved, there was a widespread view amongst interviewees that the State 
would have benefited from requiring a greater ongoing use of UPBs. Further, the 
exclusion of State Agreement mines from the MRF was identified as a significant 
gap in existing policy. 
There were divergent views about whether the MRF was intended to encourage 
compliance or progressive rehabilitation, or whether that was the responsibility of 
the State’s wider mine closure and environmental framework. This was the topic 
where interviewees suggested the most need for regulatory or legislative change, 
although there were differing views as to what this should entail. 
E    Thesis Structure 
In this thesis, following the above introductory context, I describe the mining 
securities system, and the development and implementation of the MRF Act. In 
Chapter III, I explain the approach to this research, including how and why the 
empirical method was applied.  
Chapter IV describes and analyses the results of this research, including 
interviewees’ discussion of the objectives of the MRF, their experiences to date, 
and suggested improvements to the framework.  
The final chapter concludes on whether the MRF has been successful in meeting 
its objectives, based on interviews and the associated literature.  
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II    MINING SECURITIES IN WESTERN AUSTRALIA 
This chapter considers the mining securities system in Western Australia (‘WA’) 
prior to the introduction of the Mining Rehabilitation Fund (‘MRF’). It sets out 
the issues with abandoned and legacy mine sites, policy concerns which resulted 
in the reform of the mining securities system, the consultation process in 
developing the legislation, and approaches other jurisdictions have taken. Finally, 
it describes the legislative requirements of the MRF, and the operation of the 
MRF to date. 
A    Mining Securities – The Need for Change  
1    Financial Assurance Requirements 
The principal objective of mining securities is to provide financial assurance for 
the State government by ensuring that sufficient funds are available for the 
government to rehabilitate mine sites, if a tenement holder failed to satisfy their 
mine rehabilitation and closure obligations. 31  As such, they are an important 
regulatory mechanism that provides assurance to the government and community 
that appropriate mine rehabilitation and closure will be attained.32  
The mining securities system applies to all mining operations and higher risk 
prospecting and exploration activities granted pursuant to the Mining Act 1978 
(WA) (‘Mining Act’). 33 The Department of Mines and Petroleum (‘DMP’), later 
to be renamed the Department of Mines, Industry Regulation and Safety, was 
responsible for regulating subsequent mining activities under the Mining Act, as 
well as promoting investment in resource exploration and development in WA.34  
                                                 
31  Several factors were identified as reasons for an operator’s failure to rehabilitate, including 
financial difficulties, low commodity prices, uneconomic operations or poorer than expected 
mineralisation. Other potential causes were environmental or technical issues, due to 
geological conditions or natural disasters, or the influence of the local community: Department 
of Mines and Petroleum (WA), Western Australia's Mining Security System, Preferred Option 
Paper (2011) 4. 
32  Ibid. 
33 Although this represents the vast majority of mine sites in WA, the mining securities 
provisions of the Mining Act do not apply to mining operations where the State does not own 
the mineral rights or to State Agreement Act projects which are not subject to the Mining Act 
1978 (WA): Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), above n 17. 
34  As of 1 July 2017, the Department of Mines and Petroleum (DMP) was amalgamated with the 
Department of Commerce to create the Department of Mines, Industry Regulation and Safety 
(DMIRS). Since the DMP was the responsible department at the time when interviews were 
conducted, it will be referred to as the DMP throughout this thesis. 
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Under the Mining Act, the Minister may require a tenement holder to lodge 
security for compliance with conditions imposed to prevent or reduce injury to the 
tenement land. 35  Prior to the MRF, this was in the form of Unconditional 
Performance Bonds (‘UPBs’), 36  which the MRF has now replaced. 37  UPBs, 
calculated based on the total surface area disturbed on the operations (the 
footprint),38 continued to be held until formally discharged upon completion of 
rehabilitation.39 
2    The Inadequacy of Bonds 
Although the initial aim of UPBs was to make the financial risk to the State 
negligible,40 they were not increased in line with rising rehabilitation standards 
and costs. 41  Accordingly, they were often substantially less than the actual 
rehabilitation cost if an operator failed to meet rehabilitation obligations, and by 
2008, it was estimated that UPBs represented just 25 per cent of the total 
rehabilitation cost that they were providing security against.42 
The key perceived advantage of UPBs was that the bond remained available to 
support site rehabilitation, even in the event of an operator’s insolvency or other 
failure to rehabilitate.43 However, due to the inadequacy of the bonds to fund 
rehabilitation, this seldom occurred.44 This issue was further compounded by the 
                                                 
35  Mining Act 1978 (WA) ss 52, 60, 70F, 84A, 90, 92. 
36  A UPB is a contract between the Minister, on behalf of the State and a tenement holder, which 
must be approved by the DMP and guaranteed by a financial institution. It guarantees payment 
to the state a fixed sum, should the tenement holder fail to meet the environmental conditions 
of the tenement: Department of Mines, Industry Regulation and Safety (WA), Unconditional 
Performance Bonds (UPBs) <http://www.dmp.wa.gov.au/Minerals/Unconditional-
Performance-Bonds-5703.aspx>. 
37  Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), above n 20, 1. 
38  These were outlined in the approved mining proposal. Higher risk areas such as tailings, pit 
disposal and waste dumps were subject to a greater rate per hectare than less damaging 
activities, such as roads, camp sites, or strip mining: Department of Mines and Petroleum 
(WA), above n 17, 4.  
39  Department of Mines, Industry Regulation and Safety (WA), above n 36. 
40  Phil Gorey et al, ‘Critical elements in implementing fundamental change in public 
environmental policy: Western Australia’s mine closure and rehabilitation securities reform’ 
(2016) 23(4) Australasian Journal of Environmental Management 370, 375. 
41  Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), n 17, 4. 
42  Ibid. 
43  Sommer and Gardner, above n 25, 253-255. 
44  Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), above n 17, 4. 
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system’s inflexibility, whereby UPBs could only be spent on rehabilitating the 
tenement for which they were lodged. 45  There was, and remains, significant 
additional rehabilitation requirements at historic or pre-bonding abandoned mine 
sites,46 for which no pool of funding was available to address rehabilitation.  
Following a review of the mining securities system in 2008, the Department of 
Industry and Resources 47  concluded that a UPB system remained the most 
effective approach, with no alternative offering a comparable level of financial 
assurance.48 This resulted in a recommendation to the State government that bond 
rates should be gradually increased over six years to approximate the full cost of 
rehabilitation and mine closure.49 However, in light of the global financial crisis, 
the Minister placed a moratorium on bond rates until 2010 and the increase was 
not implemented.50 
In the interim, the Minister requested the DMP to investigate alternative options 
for mining securities, and the DMP initiated a further review of the mining 
securities system in 2009 (‘DMP Review’). 51  Acknowledging the significant 
financial impact of a full cost bond system on the industry, and resultant effect on 
the State and community,52 the DMP pursued suitable alternatives that would 
provide a comparable, or better outcome for the State while not overly restricting 
industry development.53 Mine sites that are not subject to the mining security 
provisions of the Mining Act were not included in the review.54  
                                                 
45  Ibid. 
46  Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), Abandoned Mines Policy (January 2016). The 
policy states that the DMP’s database, which is itself not a complete record, records over 190 
000 abandoned mine features in WA. 
47  The current Department of Mines, Industry Regulation and Safety was the Department of 
Industry and Resources in 2008. 
48  Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), above n 17. 
49  Ibid 8-9. 
50  Department of Premier and Cabinet (WA), ‘Environmental bond freeze offers relief to miners’ 
(Media Statement, 19 December 2008). 
51  Gorey et al, above n 40, 376. 
52  Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), above n 31, 4. 
53  Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), above n 17, 2. 
54  Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), above n 31, 6. 
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3    Reform of the Mining Security System 
As part of the DMP review, the DMP undertook a consultation process with 
industry stakeholders, releasing a Preliminary Discussion Paper on Policy 
Options for Mining Securities in Western Australia (‘Preliminary Paper’) for 
public comment in December 2010.55  
The DMP stated that WA’s system of mining securities based on UPBs ‘exposed 
the government to an unacceptable level of risk’.56 The rapid expansion of the 
mining industry had resulted in an increase in the scale and number of projects 
and the area under mining. The DMP also noted concern about the increasing 
number of mines held under care and maintenance, and suggested that, 
effectively, some may have been abandoned. It also identified heightened risk 
with sale transactions of operations approaching their end-of-life, with significant 
environmental liabilities, to smaller, less financially secure operators. 57 
The Preliminary Paper proposed three mining securities options: a reform of the 
existing system of UPBs to the full cost of rehabilitation, the introduction of a 
government-administered fidelity fund, and an insurance-based system.58 
The option of reforming the previous UPB mining securities system, by 
increasing bonds to reflect the full cost of rehabilitation was initially considered 
to be the default option, as it was familiar and well understood. It also ensured 
that any breach of their obligations by an individual operator was borne solely by 
that operator, and not by the entire industry or taxpayer. 59  It could be 
implemented within the current legislative framework, so would not require the 
passage of significant new legislation.60  
However, the mining industry was not in favour of the UPB system due to the 
high set up and maintenance costs, with the annual cost of bank guarantees 
potentially as high as three per cent of the bond.61 The DMP recognised the UPB 
                                                 
55  Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), above n 17. 
56  Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), above n 31, 8. 
57  Ibid 7. 
58  Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), above n 17. 
59  Ibid 10-12. 
60  Ibid. 
61  Ibid 11. 
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system to be burdensome and inequitable, particularly on smaller operators with 
limited access to capital. 62  The industry perceived the UPB system to be 
burdensome due to the administrative burden in maintaining and discharging 
bonds due to the difficulty in demonstrating the completion of rehabilitation 
activities, which was compounded by each tenement assessed and bonded 
separately, rather than as an entire project.63  
In a detailed analysis of the mining securities system across international and 
Australian jurisdictions, the DMP noted that while the predominant financial 
assurance method was bank-guaranteed performance bonds,64 there were often 
issues with the adequacy of the bonds. This was subsequently confirmed by the 
WA Auditor General (‘Auditor General’) in 2011 (‘2011 Report’),65 who found 
that UPBs covered less than 25 per cent of the predicted rehabilitation cost of 
mine sites across the State. 
While the low level of UPBs exposed the State to potentially significant 
environmental and financial risks,66 the likelihood of this risk materialising in full 
was relatively low.67 In instances of operator insolvency, usually another operator 
would seek to take over the site, and accept responsibility for rehabilitation.68  
The second option, was a fidelity fund model whereby all tenement holders paid a 
levy into a fund to be held against the State’s exposure to operators’ failure to 
meet rehabilitation obligations.69 This model created a pool of funds not allocated 
to any specific tenement, which the State could use to rehabilitate any existing 
abandoned mine sites.70 It was also more appealing to smaller mine operators, as 
it alleviated the higher capital costs of funding UPBs. However, such a model was 
                                                 
62  The DMP described the full bond option as ‘inequitable and onerous’, Department of Mines 
and Petroleum (WA), above n 31, 17. 
63  Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), above n 17, 6. 
64  Ibid 22-24. 
65  Auditor General Western Australia, above n 3, 12-15. 
66  Ibid 32; Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), above n 31, 9. 
67  By November 2010, the DMP noted that only $2.5 million of bonds, of a total of over $800 
million, had been called in due to a tenement holder’s insolvency or failure to rehabilitate: 
Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), above n 17, 4. 
68  Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), above n 31, 7. 
69  Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), above n 17, 12. 
70  Ibid. 
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unproven internationally, and would incur administrative costs in establishing 
systems for the DMP to calculate and monitor the payment of levies.71 
The final option, an insurance-based system, was considered the least attractive. 
Not only was the cost to industry similar to that of UPBs, but it was also subject 
to the significant risk that the operators most at risk of failing to meet their 
rehabilitation obligations would be unable to obtain appropriate insurance cover.72 
4    Objectives of the Mining Securities System 
The DMP evaluated the suitability of the proposed mining security options based 
on the principal objective of ensuring that adequate funds are ‘immediately 
accessible to government to rehabilitate mine sites in the event of operators not 
fulfilling their mine rehabilitation and closure obligations’ (‘DMP Evaluation’).73 
In addition to the principal objective, the DMP Evaluation also considered six 
principles (‘Evaluation Principles’).74  
The DMP recognised the need to balance these principles against each other, 
accepting that that no one mining securities system would excel in all areas.75 The 
Evaluation Principles identified the need to avoid an unreasonable financial 
burden or adverse effect on investment in the industry (‘Evaluation Principle 1’). 
It should also promote good environmental outcomes, including progressive 
rehabilitation, and encourage compliance with legal obligations (‘Evaluation 
Principle 2’). The system should be readily accessible and administratively cost-
effective (‘Evaluation Principle 3’), and it should also be clear and effective, and 
supported by robust monitoring and enforcement, resulting in good compliance 
outcomes (‘Evaluation Principle 4’). It should allow a flexible cost calculation 
while reflecting the level of environmental risk (‘Evaluation Principle 5’).  
In this thesis, these Evaluation Principles have been used, in conjunction with 
interviewee responses to evaluate the effectiveness of the MRF. An excerpt of 
these principles can be found in Appendix A.  
                                                 
71  Ibid 12-15. 
72  Ibid 15-17. 
73 Ibid 7. 
74  Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), above n 31, 12. 
75  Ibid 9. 
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The DMP determined that the fund-based model was the most appropriate for the 
State, and sought additional comments from stakeholders in a Preferred Option 
Paper (‘Option Paper’),76 prior to making a final recommendation to the State 
government. Following this, the MRF was introduced in WA.77  
5    Mine Closure in Western Australia 
In addition to the Mining Act, mining operations in WA are subject to a range of 
environmental legislation.78 Mining rehabilitation commitments are sourced from 
mining proposals,79  which are required to gain approval to mine. All mining 
operations under the Mining Act must submit a mine closure plan in the 
prescribed manner, which incorporates rehabilitation commitments.80  
The purpose of the mine closure plan is to ensure that the eventual closure and 
rehabilitation of a mine site is addressed at each stage of the mining process, 
rather than only after mining has been completed. 81  Mine closure plans are 
intended, in conjunction with financial assurance measures, to reduce closure 
liability and environmental risk to the State and community.82 
The Auditor General’s 2011 Report identified significant weaknesses in the 
existing system of securing compliance with environmental protection conditions 
for the mining industry. 83  It noted that the DMP had focused on project 
approvals,84 and had undertaken ‘the minimum action required to obtain industry 
cooperation and compliance’.85  
                                                 
76  Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), above n 31. 
77  Western Australia, Western Australian Government Gazette, No 96, 21 June 2013, 2445.  
78  See Appendix B. 
79  Mining Act 1978 (WA) s 70O, 74(1)(ca)(i). 
80  Mining Act 1978 (WA) s 84AA; Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA) and 
Environmental Protection Authority (WA), Guidelines for Preparing Mine Closure Plans 
(2015) 4, 39; Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), Guidelines for Mining Proposals in 
Western Australia (2016). 
81  Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA) and Environmental Protection Authority (WA), 
Guidelines for Preparing Mine Closure Plans (2015). 
82  Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), above n 31, 5; Sommer and Gardner, above n 25, 
243. 
83  Auditor General Western Australia, above n 3. 
84  Ibid 17. 
85  Ibid 8. 
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Relevantly, the Auditor General was critical of the State’s management of 
environmental compliance, and the resultant exposure to potentially high financial 
risk. 86  Information submitted by miners was not adequately reviewed by the 
DMP, and there was no oversight to ensure that all miners lodged necessary 
documents, resulting in poor monitoring of the industry. 87  The 2011 Report 
emphasised the need for improved reporting by miners about their environmental 
management, and the need for the DMP to improve its records management.88 
This was intended to be supplemented by a more rigorous inspection process, to 
improve identification of non-compliance or inaccurate reporting. 
B    The Mining Rehabilitation Fund 
The MRF, established by the Mining Rehabilitation Fund Act 2012 (WA) (‘MRF 
Act’), requires all holders of mining authorisations89 to pay a non-refundable levy 
into the Fund.90 The MRF became compulsory from 1 July 2014, with an optional 
period from 1 July 2013.91 
The purpose of the MRF is ‘to provide a source of funding for the rehabilitation 
of abandoned mine sites and other land affected by mining operations carried out 
in, on or under those sites’.92 As an agency special purpose account under the 
Financial Management Act 2006 (WA),93 the principal of funds paid into the 
MRF are restricted to rehabilitation work on abandoned mine sites for which 
contributions were made. The interest generated may be used to rehabilitate 
legacy abandoned mine sites, as well as to cover administration costs of the Fund 
and the MRF Act.94 The MRF therefore represented a mechanism not just to gain 
financial assurance from existing tenement holders, thereby reducing the State’s 
                                                 
86  Ibid 32. 
87  Ibid 19. 
88  Ibid 25. 
89  Mining authorisations include Mining Act 1978 (WA) mining leases and prescribed State 
Agreement tenements: Mining Rehabilitation Fund Act 2012 (WA) s 4. 
90  Mining Rehabilitation Fund Act 2012 (WA) s 11. 
91  Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), Mining Rehabilitation Fact Sheet (2015) 2. 
92  Mining Rehabilitation Fund Act 2012 (WA) s 6. 
93  Financial Management Act 2006 (WA) s 16. 
94  Mining Rehabilitation Fund Act 2012 (WA) s 8(1)-(2); Department of Mines and Petroleum 




exposure but also to address legacy issues caused by previous deficiencies in the 
State’s environmental framework.95 
The MRF does not relieve a tenement holders’ obligation to perform mine closure 
and rehabilitation as stipulated in the approved mining plans and mine closure 
plans.96 It will only be used to undertake rehabilitation in the event of a premature 
mine closure. It is used as a last resort for abandoned sites only ‘after every effort 
has been made to trace responsible parties and recover funds’. 97  The chief 
executive of the DMP may declare land to be an abandoned mine site and 
authorise rehabilitation work to be undertaken.98 
A Mining Rehabilitation Advisory Panel, 99  established under the MRF Act 
provides advice to the Director General of DMP on the administration and 
implementation of the MRF Act.100  
1    MRF Levy Calculation and Reporting 
The basis of calculation of the levy is specified in the Mining Rehabilitation Fund 
Regulations 2013 (WA) (‘MRF Regulations’). 101  The MRF levy, payable 
annually is one per cent of the rehabilitation liability estimate (‘RLE’).102  
A tenement’s RLE is calculated by multiplying the total area of land in a category 
by a unit rate,103 and the type of disturbance, based an operator’s self-assessment 
of the area of land disturbed, other than for rehabilitated land which is assessed by 
the DMP, in accordance with Table 1.104  
                                                 
95  Western Australia, Legislative Assembly, 15 August 2012, 5011 (Colin Barnett). 
96  Mining Rehabilitation Fund Act 2012 (WA) s 9A. 
97  Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), n 20, 2.  
98  Mining Rehabilitation Fund Act 2012 (WA) s 9, 10. 
99  The Mining Rehabilitation Advisory Panel meets quarterly to provide independent expert 
advice to the Director General of the DMP on MRF issues, including any rehabilitation work 
undertaken by the MRF, and the development of the Abandoned Mines Policy: Department of 
Mines and Petroleum (WA), Mining Rehabilitation Advisory Panel (MRAP) 
<http://www.dmp.wa.gov.au/Environment/Mining-Rehabilitation-Advisory-4989.aspx>. 
100  Mining Rehabilitation Fund Act 2012 (WA) s 33.  
101  Ibid s 13. 
102  Mining Rehabilitation Fund Regulations 2013 (WA) reg 4(1). 
103  Ibid reg 4(2). 
104  Table excerpt from Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), Mining Rehabilitation Fund –  















$2,000 per hectare 
 Self-assessed 







categorised by Unit 
rates list $18,000-
$50,000 per hectare 
Categories A, B, C 
Self-assessed 
$2,000 per hectare 
Category E 
DMP sign-off 
No levy payable 
Table 1 MRF Categories for prospecting/exploration activities and other disturbances 
The rehabilitation liability categories and unit rates are set out in Schedule 1 to 
the MRF Regulations. While operators with a RLE under $50 000 are exempt 
from the levy,106 all tenement holders are required to provide the DMP with data 
on their level of ground disturbance.  
The level of ground disturbance used to calculate the MRF is reported through the 
Environmental Assessment and Regulatory System (‘EARS2’). 107  The 
disturbance data reported online through EARS2 in the form of a tenement’s 
Annual Environmental Report (‘AER’),108  is used to calculate the MRF levy, 
following which levy assessment notices are sent to operators.109  
                                                 
105  The DMP’s Mining Rehabilitation Fund – Guidance states ‘For mining disturbances to be 
reported as ‘Land Under Rehabilitation’ (Category E), the completion criteria within the 
relevant Mine Closure Plan (or the closure obligations within the relevant Mining Proposal) 
must have been fully met and monitoring of rehabilitation must have commenced as per mine 
closure plans, and the entity has commenced monitoring.’: Department of Mines and 
Petroleum (WA), above n 20, 7. 
106  Mining Rehabilitation Fund Regulations 2013 (WA) s 4(3). 
107  The EARS2 reporting system allows online lodgement and tracking of the submission of 
compliance reports, principally the Annual Environmental Report (‘AER’). 
108  Submitting an AER is a mandatory condition for most mines regulated under the Mining Act 
1978 (WA) and provides the DMP with information about mine performance, and non-
compliance with the approval conditions: Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), 
Guidelines for the Preparation of an Annual Environmental Report (2015). 
109  The MRF levy is paid via Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) using the details found on the levy 
assessment notice: Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), above n 20, 4. 
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2    Retention of Performance Bonds  
In most cases, the annual contribution of the MRF levy acts as a replacement for 
UPBs, which were released back to the tenement holders. 110  However, the 
Minister for Mines and Petroleum (‘Minister’) retains the discretion to require 
that a tenement holder lodges a UPB under the Mining Act, in addition to the 
MRF contribution.111 
The DMP has indicated that the requirements for UPBs will be imposed only on 
tenements deemed to have an increased risk of the rehabilitation liability falling 
upon the State.112 This includes tenement holders that have entered administration 
or liquidation, entered a deed of company arrangement or are the subject of an 
order for winding-up or de-registration.113 It also includes tenements where there 
has been previous failure to comply with the rehabilitation obligations of the 
Mining Act, to report or make levy contributions under the MRF Act, or make 
payment of royalties. 114  
3    Reforming Environmental Regulation  
Prior to the introduction of the MRF, the DMP implemented a wider set of 
reforms addressing the perceived regulatory deficiencies. 115  As part of these 
reforms, the DMP made improvements to its systems to share information across 
the various departments where there might be non-compliance, tracking issues 
such as failure to pay rent, submit required forms, or meet expenditure 
requirements.116  
The intention of the reform was not only to improve compliance, but also to allow 
the public release of environmental data, and to improve environmental approval 
                                                 
110  Ibid 2. 
111  The methodology for determining UPBs is set out in the Mining Rehabilitation Fund 
Regulations 2013 (WA), and is substantially increased over previous levels, with rates of up to 
$50,000 per hectare are in place for those areas deemed to have the highest level of 
disturbance. Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), The Administration of mining 
securities for mine sites regulated by the Department of Mines and Petroleum (2014). 
112  Ibid. 
113  Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), above n 20, 3. 
114  Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), above n 111. 
115  Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), Reforming Environmental Regulation (2012). 
116  Ibid 2. 
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processes, thereby reducing administrative overhead on the mining industry, and 
encouraging foreign investment in the industry.117  
4    State Agreements 
Land granted in WA may operate under a multiplicity of tenure. 118  State 
Agreements are generally used for major long-term resource projects, particularly 
those that require significant infrastructure to be developed, where their needs 
cannot be met by the existing system. Some of the most significant resource 
projects are developed under a legal contract specifying the agreement with the 
WA government for the development of that resource.119  
These State Agreements are ratified by individual Acts of Parliament, although 
they do not have force of law, so are not binding on anyone but the parties to the 
contract, and they are bound by the Environmental Protection Act 1986 (WA) 
(‘EP Act’).120 Each State Agreement details the specific rights, obligations, terms 
and conditions for development of an individual project.121  
While they are not equivalent to an Act of Parliament,122 they take effect despite 
other laws unless expressly stated in the State Agreement,123 and are excluded 
from the scope of the Mining Act, unless the State Agreement specifies 
otherwise.124 Therefore, State Agreements are excluded from the MRF Act.125 
However, they may fall within it if they are a mining authorisation under the 
MRF Act.126  
                                                 
117  Explanatory Memorandum, Mining Legislation Amendment Bill 2013 (WA). 
118  Systems of tenure include land granted under the Land Administration Act 1997 (WA), 
Petroleum Pipelines Act 1969 (WA), Petroleum and Geothermal Energy Resources Act 1967 
(WA) and the various State Agreements granted under the relevant State Agreement Acts.  
119  Michael Hunt, Tim Kavenagh and James Hunt, Hunt on Mining Law of Western Australia 
(The Federation Press, 5th ed, 2015) 13. 
120  Richard Hillman, ‘The Future of State Agreements in Western Australia’ (2006) 25(3) 
Australian Resources and Energy Law Journal 293. 
121  Ibid. 
122  Hunt, Kavenagh and Hunt, above n 119, 15. 
123  Government Agreements Act 1979 (WA) s 3. 
124  Mining Act 1978 (WA) s 5(1). 
125  Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), Mining Rehabilitation Fund (MRF) Frequently 
Asked Questions (2017) 5. 
126  Mining Rehabilitation Fund Act 2012 (WA) s 4. 
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While the State retains discretionary powers to impose UPBs over State 
Agreement mines, these are not commonly used. 127  This means that WA 
effectively retains two different regimes for mining rehabilitation. State 
Agreements have been a long-standing element of mining development in WA, 
and continue to retain the support of successive governments. 
5    The Initial Operation of the MRF 
As of 30 June 2017, the MRF had assets of $92.4 million.128 During the year 
ending 30 June 2017, it received $28.3 million of industry contributions, and 
earned $1.6 million in interest.129 The Fund spent $832 000 on rehabilitation and 
other operational expenditure, the highest profile event being the partial 
rehabilitation of Ellendale Diamond Mine (‘Ellendale’).130 
6    Ellendale Diamond Mine 
The first major application of the MRF was in July 2015, when the operator of 
Ellendale, Kimberley Diamond Company Pty Ltd (‘KDC’) was placed into 
administration by its parent company, the ASX-listed Kimberley Diamonds 
Limited (‘KDL’).131 KDC opted in to the MRF in the voluntary period, and the 
DMP returned $12.1 million of UPBs to KDC. 132  Between 2013-2014, KDC 
contributed $818 826.40 to the MRF. 
Liquidators were appointed to KDC, and lodged a ‘Notice of Disclaimer of 
Onerous Property’ 133  with the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission.134 The liquidator disclaimed any interest held by KDC in the two 
                                                 
127 Office of the Auditor General Western Australia, Ensuring Compliance with Conditions on 
Mining – Follow up, Report 20 (2014). 
128 Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), Annual Report 2016-2017 (2017) 134. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Nick Evans, ‘Fund may foot Ellendale bill’, The West (online), 3 July 2015 
<https://thewest.com.au/news/wa/fund-may-foot-ellendale-bill-ng-ya-124762>; Nick Evans, 
‘Liquidators try to dump mine’, The West Australian (online), 21 October 2015 
<https://au.news.yahoo.com/thewest/wa/a/29861758/liquidators-try-to-dump-mine/#page1>. 
132 Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 11 August 2015, 3290 (Robin 
Chapple). 
133 The Notice of Disclaimer of Onerous Property was lodged under section 568A(1)(b) of the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 
134 Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), Ellendale Information Sheet (2015). 
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tenements on which Ellendale was located. Ownership, together with the 
associated rehabilitation obligations, reverted to the State. It was the first time that 
section 568A(1)(b) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (‘Corporations Act’) was 
used to disclaim mining rehabilitation liabilities on liquidation of an entity. The 
extent of the rehabilitation liability was estimated at $24.5 million on the date of 
transfer by KDL,135 although media coverage suggested a liability of $40 million 
based on DMP estimates.136  
Ellendale was gazetted and declared an abandoned site pursuant to section 9(1) of 
the MRF Act,137 with the State’s immediate priority being to ensure the area was 
‘safe, stable, and non-polluting’.138 The DMP accessed MRF funds to undertake 
work necessary to address immediate safety or environmental risks, at a cost of 
approximately $80 000 by April 2016.139  
The abandonment of Ellendale attracted significant publicity and debate.140 The 
MRF was used to meet immediate safety requirements meaning that such costs 
were not borne by the taxpayer. However, it raised the question of whether the 
MRF was sufficient to fund the rehabilitation of abandoned mines such as 
Ellendale, particularly if there were multiple similar abandonments within a short 
period, an issue noted by Sommer and Gardner.141  
The DMP announced that the site will not be fully rehabilitated or closed, as their 
intention was to ensure that it remains viable for responsible future development 
under a new operator, 142  to avoid the State incurring the full rehabilitation 
                                                 
135 Kimberley Diamonds Ltd, Kimberley Diamonds Ltd Annual Report 2016 (2016) 98. 
136 Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), above n 134. 
137  Western Australia, Western Australian Government Gazette, No 181, 4 December 2015, 4854. 
138 Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), Ellendale first site to be gazetted under the Mining 
Rehabilitation Fund Act, 4 December 2015 <http://www.dmp.wa.gov.au/News/Ellendale-first-
site-to-be-17225.aspx>. 
139 Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), Ellendale Information Sheet 2 (2016). 
140 Ben Collins, ‘Minister moves to reopen Ellendale diamond mine and avoid environmental 
costs’, ABC (online), 27 January 2017 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-01-27/minister-
moves-to-reopen-ellendale-diamond-mine-and-avoid-costs/8217874>; Cole Latimer, Ellendale 
may be handed back to the state, Australian Mining (21 October 2015) 
<https://www.australianmining.com.au/news/ellendale-may-be-handed-back-to-the-state/>. 
141 Sommer and Gardner, above n 25, 252. 
142 Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), above n 134. 
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liability. There has been no sale to date, and the State continues to monitor the 
site.143 
C    Other Australian Frameworks 
The importance of establishing an effective mining securities or financial 
assurance framework is common to all jurisdictions in which mines operate. New 
South Wales (‘NSW’), Northern Territory (‘NT’), Queensland, Victoria and 
South Australia all require bonds, usually at 100 per cent of the rehabilitation 
liability,144 although in reality the inadequacy of financial assurance remains a 
common issue, 145  with deficiencies noted in New South Wales 146  and 
Queensland.147 Three jurisdictions with significant resource sectors are discussed 
further below as examples. 
1    Queensland 
Queensland has experienced similar issues to WA in respect of exposure to 
rehabilitation obligations, with the Yabulu nickel refinery (‘Yabulu’),148 and Linc 
Energy149 both achieving recent media prominence, in addition to reports of a $3 
billion unfunded liability for the Queensland coal industry.150 
In response, the Queensland Government introduced the Environmental 
Protection (Chain of Responsibility) Amendment Act 2016 (Qld), which amended 
                                                 
143 Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), above n 139. 
144 Sommer and Gardner, above n 25, 255. 
145 McLeod, above n 26. 
146 Lisa Main and Dominique Schwartz, ‘Industry insider warns taxpayers may foot bill for mine 
rehabilitation unless government, industry step up’, ABC (online), 19 September 2015 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-09-19/taxpayers-may-foot-bill-for-mine-
rehabilitation/6787954>. 
147 The Queensland Audit Office’s recent analysis suggests that Queensland has made progress in 
reducing this disparity in recent years through increasing bonds. As a result, the Queensland 
government holds $6.8 billion of bonds against an estimated environmental liability of $8.7 
billion. See Queensland Audit Office, Follow-up of Report 15: 2013-2014 Environmental 
regulation of the resources and waste industries, Report No 1 (2017) 16.  
148 Dominque Schwartz and Mark Solomons, ‘Clive Palmer’s Yabulu refinery under 
environmental scrutiny as $93m clean-up bill revealed’, ABC (online), 21 April 2016. 
149 Sarah Vogler and Rhian Deutrom, ‘Linc Energy could leave taxpayers with a $25 million bill 
for cleaning up Dalby plant’, The Sunday Mail (Qld), 17 April 2016. 
150 Mark Willacy, ‘Taxpayers exposed to $3b clean-up bill of Queensland’s coal mines, 




the Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld) (‘Chain of Responsibility’).151 This 
increased the State’s ability to enforce compliance with environmental 
obligations, by authorising the State to issue environmental protection orders to 
‘related persons’ of companies that do not comply with their obligations, enabling 
the State to extend responsibility to group companies, directors, or other 
associated entities.152 
Queensland is currently undertaking a review of its financial assurance 
framework, 153  which currently relies on UPBs. The review recommended a 
‘tailored solution’ consisting of three categories of security, recognising that a 
‘one size fits all’ approach does not work, and the need for flexibility and 
optionality for various resources operators within the State.154  For lower risk 
miners, there would be rehabilitation fund. Larger or financially riskier operators 
would continue to be subject to a bond-based model. The very largest and most 
creditworthy operators would be subject to Selected Partner Agreements which 
would involve paying an annual charge, but no UPB.155 This remains subject to 
public consultation in Queensland. 
2    Northern Territory  
The NT retains the use of UPBs for the full cost of the rehabilitation liability. In 
addition, it requires operators to contribute an annual levy set at one per cent of 
their bond balance,156 which is used to address historic disturbance.157 The NT has 
therefore adopted a hybrid approach which replicates the pooled fund model of 
the MRF, while retaining the individual assurance of UPBs.  
                                                 
151 Department of Environment and Heritage Protection, Queensland Government, Policy and 
legislation changes (23 December 2016) <https://www.ehp.qld.gov.au/management/env-
policy-legislation/policy-legislation-
changes.html#environmental_protection_chain_of_responsibility>.  
152 Explanatory Notes, Environmental Protection (Chain of Responsibility) Amendment Bill 2016 
(Qld) 1; Environmental Protection (Chain of Responsibility) Amendment Act 2016 (Qld). 
153 Queensland Treasury Corporation, Review of Queensland’s Financial Assurance Framework 
(2017). 
154 Ibid 64. 
155 Ibid 48. 
156 Mining Management Act 2001 (NT) pts 4, 4A. 
157 Mining Management Amendment Act 2013 (NT). 
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3    New South Wales 
NSW also retains the requirement for security deposits which cover the full cost 
of rehabilitation.158 However, a recent New South Wales Audit Office review of 
their mining securities framework by the has highlighted both the lack of 
contingency, and the risk of environmental degradation after the deposit has been 
returned.159 The review also identified the need for a clear limit on the length of 
time that mines may be placed in care and maintenance.160 
 D    Concluding Remarks 
The approach WA has adopted in reforming the State’s mining securities system 
and financial assurance mechanism is unique, and has attracted international 
attention.161 The MRF has been analysed and acclaimed as a policy innovation by 
some commentators, describing it as ‘a positive example for other regions of the 
world struggling with how to manage both expected and unintended mine 
closures into the future’.162  
However, there has been little research on the effect of the MRF, and how 
effectively it has operated in practice. This paper aims to expand knowledge in 
this area, by gaining insight through interviewing lawyers who have experienced 
the effects of the MRF. The empirical research approach used to achieve this will 
be discussed in the following Chapter. 
  
                                                 
158 New South Wales Department of Planning & Environment, Mine assessment and 
Rehabilitation <https://www.resourcesandenergy.nsw.gov.au/miners-and-
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159 New South Wales Audit Office, Mining Rehabilitation Security Deposits (2017) 2. 
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III    RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This Chapter begins with a discussion of the empirical research method, and the 
reasons why interviewing lawyers with direct experience of the MRF was 
considered suitable for this research. It then outlines the process involved in 
applying the empirical method, including data collection, data storage, and data 
analysis.  
A    Empirical Research Method 
The empirical research method utilises observable real-world data to make 
inferences about a research question.163 It was considered suitable for this thesis 
due to the lack of any similar empirical research in this area. 
Mining securities system has been well-studied, including detailed theoretical 
assessments on the various financial assurance systems. 164  While academic 
literature such as McLeod has compared mining securities systems,165 and others 
have made theoretical critiques of the MRF,166 or compared it to other mining 
securities frameworks, 167  there has been no research to date on the practical 
effects of the MRF. 
Furthermore, while the MRF was developed following a detailed consultative 
process with industry stakeholders, there has been relatively little effort to link the 
theoretical assessments of the MRF to the experience of lawyers working in the 
industry,168 who are expected to have both their clients’ interests, as well as their 
obligations and duties under the MRF regime in mind.  
This thesis will identify some of the gaps between the ‘formal law’ of the MRF 
legislation, and the ‘practical reality’ of how the MRF operates,169 by examining 
the effect of the MRF as perceived by interviewees with significant experience in 
                                                 
163  Felicity Bell, ‘Empirical Research in Law’ (2016) 25 (2) Griffith Law Review 262, 263. 
164  Ben White et al, ‘Optimal Environmental Policy Design for Mine Rehabilitation and Pollution 
with a Risk of Non-Compliance owing to Firm Insolvency’ (2012) 56 Australian Journal of 
Agriculture and Resource Economics 280. 
165 McLeod, above n 26. 
166 Morrison-Saunders and Pope, above n 162; Sommer and Gardner, above n 25. 
167 McLeod, above n 26. 
168 Frans L Leeuw and Hans Schmeets, Empirical Legal Research: A Guidance Book for Lawyers, 
Legislators and Regulators (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016) 226. 
169 Bell, above n 163, 275. 
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its implementation. Using interviewee responses, this thesis will identify the 
perceived effects and impacts of the introduction of the MRF on the mining 
industry, the State and the environment, and consider whether the intention of the 
MRF has matched expectations, thereby providing a ‘reality check’.170 It will also 
identify areas where law may be incomplete, or not operating as intended,171 and 
will consider interviewees’ recommendations on how the mining securities 
system might be made more effective.172  
B    Data Collection 
The interviews focused on gaining insight into interviewees’ views on the 
effectiveness of the MRF, formed through their experience, or that of their clients. 
The interviewees were in key positions to understand the MRF, and contribute to 
a discussion of its impact and effectiveness. All had experienced the effects of the 
MRF in WA, either firsthand, or following exposure through their client work. 
Their experience is drawn from a variety of different roles, including mining or 
environmental law partners in practice, senior legal counsel for mining 
companies, and senior government department officials.  
Interviewees were initially selected from professional contacts via a variety of 
sources, including employment and networking events. Candidates were initially 
selected with a focus on lawyers with extensive mining or environmental law 
expertise,173 who could provide valuable insight into the implementation of the 
MRF since its inception.  
Further interviewees were then identified and selected using the snowball 
sampling method, whereby the initial contacts were asked to recommend other 
potential interviewees who had the potential to generate a range of useful insights 
and understanding. Potential interviewees were screened through law firm 
websites. Due to the limited scope of this research, the sample size was limited to 
10 interviewees. 
                                                 
170 Leeuw and Schmeets, above n 168, 226. 
171 Bell, above n 163, 277. 
172 Robert Landry, ‘Empirical scientific research and legal studies research – A missing link: 
Empirical scientific research and legal studies research’ (2016) 33(1) Journal of Legal Studies 
Education 165, 170. 
173 Suitable interviewees were senior lawyers with between 7 to 15 years’ experience in mining or 
environmental law, or within the mining industry as in-house lawyers. 
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Interviews were undertaken between April 2017 and June 2017, and were semi-
structured with a list of open-ended questions,174 adapted to each interviewee.175 
Each interview developed spontaneously from the initial responses provided, and 
interviewees were encouraged to provide further detail about responses, or to 
raise additional matters they considered relevant. Interviews ran for around 45 
minutes. All interviews were recorded and transcribed, and notes were made for 
reference.  
All interviewees were provided with information about the purpose and nature of 
the project and a consent form which detailed expectations around confidentiality, 
and permission to record the interview.176 All interviewees provided informed 
consent to participate in the interview and agreed to the recording of the 
interview. 
C    Data Storage 
This research project was approved by the Murdoch University Human Research 
Ethics Committee.177 It was conducted in compliance with Murdoch University 
and National research standards.178  
Data storage for interview data such as interview recording, and transcripts were 
carried out in accordance with Murdoch University Data Protection Guidelines. 
Interviewees’ responses have been kept anonymous, to encourage unrestricted 
discussion, with each interviewee assigned ‘MX’, 179  and some responses not 
attributed to any interviewee.180 
                                                 
174 See Appendix D for a list of interview questions. 
175 Jennifer Rowley, ‘Conducting research interviews’ (2012) 35 (3-4) Management Research 
Review 260, 263. 
176 See Appendix E for Project Information Sheet. 
177 Project No. 2017/034. 
178 National Health and Medical Research Council, National Statement on Ethical Conduct in 
Human Research 2007 (2015) 
<https://www.nhmrc.gov.au/_files_nhmrc/publications/attachments/e72_national_statement_m
ay_2015_150514_a.pdf>; National Health and Medical Research Council (2007) Australian 
Code for the Responsible Conduct of Research 
<https://www.nhmrc.gov.au/_files_nhmrc/file/publications/r39_australian_code_responsible_c
onduct_research_150811.pdf>. 
179 ‘X’ denotes the number of the interviews, which have been classified as M1 to M10. 
180 In instances where it may otherwise allow the reader to infer the interviewee’s identity or 




D    Data Processing and Analysis 
Prior to each interview, interviewees were provided with a list of questions, to 
assist in preparing responses. 181  After each interview, important points were 
noted, allowing the formulation of improved questions for the next interview. 
Following the completion of the interview process, interviews were transcribed 
verbatim and analysed to identify recurring themes and common issues raised by 
interviewees.182  
The presentation of results in Chapter IV reflects the overall nature of the 
discussion, first grouped by the stakeholders affected, and then further divided 
into specific themes raised by interviewees, including any consensus or 
disagreement among interviewees. This approach has resulted in interview data 
from which conclusions on the effect of the MRF can be made, and which will 
supplement the existing theoretical work.183 
  
                                                 
181 See Appendix D Interview Questions. 
182 Leeuw and Schmeets, above n 168, 131. 
183 Landry, above n 172, 170. 
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IV    INTERVIEW RESULTS 
A    Introduction to the Interviews 
This Chapter considers the effects of the Mining Rehabilitation Fund (‘MRF’) 
from interviewees’ perspectives,184compared against the objectives of the MRF, 
leading to an analysis of whether those objectives were satisfied. Interviewees’ 
discussion on the effects of the MRF was sorted into the effect on the mining 
industry, State and environment. For reasons of clarity and brevity, interviewees’ 
discussion of each issue has been analysed together with comparison to the 
relevant academic literature. 
The purpose of examining the objectives of the MRF was to determine whether 
interviewees’ perceptions were aligned with that of the State and the Department 
of Mines and Petroleum (‘DMP’). Interviewees were clear that the principal 
objective of the MRF was to provide the State with funding for abandoned mine 
rehabilitation.185  
The discussion below focuses on the range of views held by interviewees on the 
merits of the other objectives stated by the DMP.186 These were not universally 
accepted as legitimate purposes of the MRF, with some interviewees likening the 
MRF to a tax, with no objective other than to raise funds for the State.187  
Discussion on the effects of the MRF highlighted both expected and unexpected 
consequences of the MRF regime. Therefore, while the effects are considered 
against the objectives of the MRF, matters raised by interviewees have been 
included even when they do not relate directly to any objective, because they are 
still considered important to a complete understanding of the impact of the MRF 
in WA. 
B    Objectives of the MRF 
Interviewees were clear and unanimous about the primary intention of the MRF, 
in respect of abandoned mine sites, but had diverse views about the extent to 
                                                 
184 Interviewees are identified throughout Chapter IV as M1 to M10, with some responses referred 
to as ‘Anonymous’ in order to maintain confidentiality. 
185 Mining Rehabilitation Fund Act 2012 (WA) s 6. 
186 Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), above n 31, 12. 
187 ‘There's no environmental benefit per se. I think it's a real fiscal benefit for the State’: M3. 
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which there were other objectives. This is consistent with Gorey et al’s view that 
identifying the policy problem was not straightforward, and clarifying the 
principal objective of the mining securities framework exposed wide-ranging 
views from the State government and other stakeholders.188 
The key aim of the MRF, reflected in the Mining Rehabilitation Fund Act 2012 
(WA) (‘MRF Act’) and the principal objective (‘Principal Objective’) in the 
Preferred Option Paper (‘Option Paper’),189 was to manage the State’s contingent 
liability in respect of abandoned mines by creating a shared fund available to the 
State in remediating abandoned mines and ‘other land affected by mining 
operations carried out in, on or under those sites’, 190  achieved by requiring 
tenement holders to pay an annual levy.191  
Interviewees perceived the MRF as a legal mechanism primarily to address the 
State’s potential liability for abandoned mines. They emphasised that the MRF 
does not address all the current problems with the wider mine rehabilitation and 
environmental framework, and that it should be considered within the context of 
the wider legislative framework and other mechanisms available to the State to 
address these issues,192 particularly mine closure plans.193  
1    Financial Assurance for Abandoned Mines and Legacy Sites 
To all interviewees, the MRF was seen primarily as an initiative to address the 
issue of the State’s abandoned mines and legacy sites. They also recognised the 
inadequacies of the previous mining securities system of Unconditional 
Performance Bonds (‘UPBs’) to manage the State’s contingent liability for 
rehabilitation. It was also acknowledged that, prior to the MRF, no mechanism 
existed to rehabilitate legacy sites, other than general state revenue. The main 
objective was therefore to create a fund to address abandoned and legacy sites, by 
                                                 
188 Gorey et al, above n 40, 379. 
189 Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), above n 31, 12. See Appendix A for an excerpt of 
the Evaluation Principles, including the Principal Objective. 
190 Mining Rehabilitation Fund Act 2012 (WA) s 6. 
191 Explanatory Memorandum, Mining Rehabilitation Fund Bill 2012 (WA) 1.  
192 M2, M4, M5, M7. 
193 M3, M5, M6, M7, M9. 
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attempting to shift the cost from the general taxpayer onto the mining industry.194 
As such, the MRF was likened to an insurance policy for the State.195 
Others considered the intention for the entire industry to take responsibility for 
non-compliant operators and legacy sites, without reducing each operator’s own 
rehabilitation responsibilities. 196  The industry’s responsibility for satisfactory 
mine closure and rehabilitation outcomes is generally considered to be part of its 
‘social licence to operate’,197 and remains an integral part of business for mining 
companies.198 
Two distinct aspects to the Principal Objective were noted by interviewees. 
Firstly, the State should have prompt access to funds to perform necessary work if 
an existing mine became abandoned. Secondly, the Fund should enable the State 
to commence addressing rehabilitation issues on legacy sites. For several 
interviewees,199 it was imperative that the fund was pooled, so as to enable the 
State to manage the risks more effectively than the previous system, where each 
bond could only be used against a specific site.200 
2    Economic Efficiency 
While managing the potential liability for abandoned sites was identified as the 
primary objective, several interviewees also emphasised the impact on the 
industry as a key factor in the government’s decision to adopt the fund model.201 
They noted that the MRF was introduced to reduce the financial burden on the 
industry by freeing up capital held in performance bonds or bank guarantees, 
                                                 
194 M2, M3, M6, M10. One interviewee, however, expressed a contrary view, ‘I am concerned 
about what that means for rehabilitation in the long term, and whether it really is a cost shifting 
from a miner to the State’: M9. 
195 ‘It's there to give the state that insurance policy, but also to enable the state to have some funds 
there to get on and do some of the rehab that's needed for those abandoned mines so that 
they’re not posing a safety risk or a health risk for the community’: M2 
196 M3, M5, M8. 
197 Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), above n 17, 1. 
198 Ernst and Young, Business risks facing mining and metals 2017-2018 (2017) 8; Martin 
Brueckner et al, ‘The mining boom and Western Australia’s changing landscape: Towards 
sustainability or business as usual?’ (2013) 22(2) Rural Society 111, 121. 
199 M1, M2, M3, M7, M8. 
200 This was reflected in Evaluation Principle 3. 
201 M3, M4, M6, M8. This was reflected in Evaluation Principle 1. 
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reducing the pressure on miners’ balance sheets and cash flow.202 Instead, there 
would just be a single annual expense,203 which would reduce the initial upfront 
costs of developing mines, and encourage the development of mining in WA. 
Some interviewees commented that the MRF was designed with an expectation 
that the capital freed up from bonds would be reinvested back into the industry.204 
Others discerned an intention to send a positive political message about the 
State’s support of the mining industry. 205  The effect of reduced capital 
requirements would be particularly beneficial on smaller and medium-sized 
mining companies, 206  who would have less access to capital than the larger 
multinationals. 
3    Administrative Efficiency 
To some interviewees, improving the ease and efficiency of administering mining 
securities was another secondary, but important, objective of the MRF. 207 
Interviewees reiterated that the Fund’s pooled nature, designed to enable the State 
to take immediate action to address problems,208  compared favourably to the 
previous challenges of dealing with a myriad of bank guarantees, 209  each 
allocated to a specific tenement. Furthermore, interviewees noted that in the 
previous system there was no robust methodology for calculating the size of 
bonds. However, with the introduction of the MRF, there was the intention to 
create a clear and simple system to calculate the amount payable for each 
tenement.210 
                                                 
202 M1, M2, M3, M4, M6, M10. 
203 M7, M10. 
204 M6, M8. 
205 M1, M3, M4, M7, M10. For example, ‘… it dovetails quite nicely for the positive political 
message’: M10. 
206 M4, M7. 
207 M1, M2, M6, M7, M8. 
208 This was reflected as Evaluation Principle 3. 
209 M1, M2, M5, M6, M8. 
210 M4, M10. This was reflected as Evaluation Principles 4 and 5. 
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4    Environmental Compliance, Progressive Rehabilitation 
A significant point of divergence among interviewees was the extent to which 
encouragement of good environmental practices, such as progressive 
rehabilitation was an objective of the MRF.211 Some interviewees either did not 
perceive it as an objective,212 or downplayed any role the MRF might have in 
encouraging miners to undertake rehabilitation throughout the life of a mine, 
highlighting the impracticality of progressive rehabilitation on an operating 
mine. 213  Instead, interviewees emphasised the use of the broader legislative 
framework for mine closure and environmental compliance.214 Others noted the 
potential of the MRF to incentivise progressive rehabilitation, 215  albeit to a 
limited extent. 
However, a minority maintained that promoting progressive rehabilitation was an 
intention of the MRF,216 because the MRF calculation connected the size of the 
disturbed area, and the category of land, to the amount paid. To a few 
interviewees, this demonstrated an incentive to manage or reduce environmental 
impact,217 although this was secondary to other objectives. 
5    Concluding Remarks 
Despite some divergent views on the relative importance of the secondary 
objectives of the MRF, interviewees agreed that the creation of a centralised, 
industry-contributed fund for rehabilitation of abandoned mines and legacy sites 
was the paramount objective.  
 
                                                 
211 This was reflected as Evaluation Principle 2. 
212 ‘It's allowed performance funds to be retired which has injected some cash into the junior 
miners probably when they needed it the most. That's about all I'd say it's done for industry’: 
M4. 
213 M1, M5, M9, M10. For example, ‘There's no environmental benefit per se. I think it's a real 
fiscal benefit for the State’: M1, and ‘… to the extent that it is a positive for the environment, 
it's really sold as a positive for the State's liability in relation to the environment’: M10. 
214 M2, M3, M6, M7, M8. ‘The MRF does not exist on its own. It is just one tool and its primary 
purpose is there to provide a safety net for the [S]tate’: M2. This was reflected as Evaluation 
Principle 4. 
215 M2, M3, M4, M5, M6, M9. 
216 M6, M8. 
217 M3, M6, M8 
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Broadly, interviewees views on the MRF’s objectives were consistent with the six 
evaluation principles identified in the Option Paper (‘Evaluation Principles’).218 
As such, the Evaluation Principles represent an appropriate benchmark against 
which to evaluate the effect of the MRF.  
The discussion of interviewees’ responses and observations in the following 
Chapter will be divided broken down by the effect on the mining industry, State, 
and environment. However, the Evaluation Principles will be referred to 
throughout the discussion to evaluate whether interviewee’s responses 
demonstrate the success or failure of MRF in meeting its objectives.  
                                                 
218 Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), above n 31, 12. See above Chapter (II)(A)(4). 
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C    Effects and Impacts of the MRF 
In their consideration of the effects of the MRF, interviewees considered the 
impact of the legislation on various stakeholders. Although there was a 
reasonably consistent acceptance of the overall positive impact on the industry, 
there was some divergence in views among interviewees on the effect on the State 
and environment.  
The view of the State government was that the MRF ‘achieves a number of 
economic and environmental goals’, and was consistent with the objective of 
decreasing financial risk to the State without adversely impacting the industry.219 
Interviewees reflected on the requirement for the MRF to achieve a balance 
between competing stakeholders’ interests, which McLeod noted as challenging, 
particularly given increasing community expectations in respect of closure and 
rehabilitation.220  
To interviewees, it was imperative that the MRF was regarded as a component 
within the wider legislative framework covering a miner’s environmental 
obligations,221 and thus, by itself, could not be expected to address every issue 
identified with the previous mining securities system of UPBs.222 
1    Effect on the Mining Industry 
There was nearly universal agreement among interviewees that the significant 
reduction in the obligation to provide bonds was advantageous to the industry, 
and greatly outweighed the cost of the levy, including the additional 
administrative burden, if any.  
(a) Financial Impact of the MRF 
To all interviewees, the MRF was less costly to operate from a banking and 
operations perspective,223 and more efficient than the previous UPB system. It 
                                                 
219 Western Australia, Legislative Assembly, 15 August 2012, 5011 (Colin Barnett, Premier). 
220 McLeod, above n 26. 
221 M2, M3, M4, M5. 
222 See above Chapter II(A)(2). 
223 The MRF was described by one interviewee as a ‘pay as you go’ system: M1. 
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was a better approach than locking funds into UPBs,224 which withheld capital 
that would otherwise have been available to miners.225  
The MRF was perceived as having levelled the playing field for miners. Since 
UPBs were usually provided in the form of bank guarantees, the requirement to 
negotiate these arrangements was easier and less burdensome for larger operators, 
while junior explorers and smaller operators would encounter higher charges.226  
Without the risk of price fluctuations in obtaining bank guarantee contracts, some 
interviewees regarded the MRF to be less risky. 227  Additionally, interviewees 
found the MRF to be simpler than the UPB system, with the amount payable 
perceived as less arbitrary than bonds.228 
Some interviewees identified the ease of tenement sales under the MRF. The 
predictability was attractive from a cash perspective. Since the MRF levy 
represented an annual known cost that could be easily calculated,229 there would 
be no liability to be transferred with the sale. For most transactions, this 
eliminated doubts around the status of security bonds, and the requirement to 
draft Sale Agreement terms to factor in the return or replacement of UPBs.230 
Instead, the annual MRF levy for the tenement could simply be pro-rated between 
the two parties at the time of sale. 
Several interviewees noted the improved ease with which finance could be 
obtained for projects.231 The payment into the Fund annually made it simpler, not 
                                                 
224 ‘Even though you ultimately get back your performance bond, you don’t get back what you 
put in because the cost of money increases’: M3. 
225 As one interviewee explained, ‘Either the money had to be set aside in the bank, or the 
company can’t borrow extra money that they could otherwise borrow for the project because it 
had to give a guarantee to the bank’: M2. 
226 As one interviewee explained, ‘… the way that the bonds were negotiated with the banks 
really depended on that individual company…  there wasn't necessarily an equal system. [I]f 
you were a large multinational, you could asset-back your bonds and not necessarily have the 
same amount of cost as somebody who was a smaller operator has to cash-back those bonds 
and has money tied up that they can't use’: M6. 
227 M7, M10. 
228 M4, M6, M7, M8, M10. 
229 M3, M5, M7, M10. 
230 ‘[I]t would ultimately impact on prices because people wouldn't necessarily take the risk. But 
if they did take the risk, it be accompanied with a price reduction’: M10. 
231 M7, M10. 
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only for miners, but also financiers,232 to understand the extent of the risk, which 
in turn made it easier for proponents to obtain financing for projects. 
Reduced financing costs were seen as enabling the acceleration of project 
development.233 Furthermore, the return of bonds may have assisted some miners 
to remain in business, and would have been particularly welcome in a global 
industry where ‘debt burdens have spiralled out of control’,234 with the industry’s 
cost of finance rising and multiple credit downgrades.235 
To most miners,236 the MRF levy payable was a significant reduction on the 
previous cost of UPBs. The introduction of the MRF, in allowing over $1 billion 
of performance bonds to be retired, 237  resulted in a reduction of costs, and 
released capital back to the majority of miners, which was particularly welcomed 
by interviewees’ junior miner clients.238  
In addition to the charges paid directly to the bank, some interviewees noted the 
higher administrative costs associated with managing UPBs in the previous 
mining securities system. Interviewees with firsthand experience in the return of 
bonds described a lengthy process following completion of rehabilitation work, 
where it could take months for the bond to be discharged due to the DMP’s 
inspection program. 239  This delay often attracted senior management’s 
attention, 240  particularly when banks were vigilant about issuing or renewing 
guarantee facilities. 
                                                 
232 ‘[B]ecause some of our clients are foreign, [it was] sometimes difficult for them to get security 
bonds that were sufficient for the State's processes. Clients would want to use their existing 
facility providers from international banks… that just makes things more challenging… at 
least the new MRF process where it is just payment into a fund calculated annually is just 
clearer and easier to understand, but easier for financiers to understand the extent of the risk, 
so it is easier to get financing for projects’: M10. 
233 M1, M2, M7, M10. 
234 Deloitte, The top 10 issues mining companies will face in the coming year (2016) 31. 
235 PwC, Review of global trends in the mining industry (2016) 39. 
236 An interviewee described a small number of miners reporting a sudden increase in cost 
because of the MRF, but this was unusual, and perhaps indicative that the previous bond had 
been inadequate: M3. 
237 Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), Mining Rehabilitation Fund Yearly Report 2016 
(2016) 5.  
238 M4, M5, M7, M9. 
239 Anonymous. 
240 ‘It was not an easy process – at points we had to go to different banks’: Anonymous. 
36 
 
(b) Administration and Ease of Implementation of the MRF 
In addition to the financial levy, the introduction of the MRF also imposed further 
reporting requirements on tenement holders over the extent of ground 
disturbance.241 Interviewees acknowledged that companies would inevitably be 
cautious about the potential for increased administrative process and costs, and 
conceded that there would always be issues in implementing any new system. 
Despite some reported initial implementation issues, interviewees agreed that the 
MRF system overall was administratively attractive.  
Interviewees noted that they did not receive many inquiries from clients on the 
MRF reporting requirements, a reflection on the relative simplicity of meeting the 
MRF reporting obligations. To interviewees involved in the reporting 
requirements under the MRF Act, 242  the reporting system itself was seen as 
reasonably straightforward.243  
However, clients of large operations reported an administrative burden,244 since 
the introduction of the MRF had added to the existing multiplicity in reporting 
requirements,245 which required clients to establish internal systems to carry out 
the required reporting under the MRF.246  Despite the challenges interviewees 
mentioned, the compliance with the MRF reporting requirements was 98.8 per 
cent for 2015-16,247 indicating that miners are providing data without excessive 
difficulty. 
Interviewees attributed the main source of complexity to be the volume of 
reporting, partly due to the requirement for each tenement to be reported 
                                                 
241 See above Chapter II(B)(2) which details this reporting process. 
242 Most private lawyers had limited experience in the implementation of the MRF. Many of these 
insights were provided with those who did, or in-house lawyers. 
243 M1, M4, M5, M7, M9. 
244 In comparison, an in-house lawyer of a small to mid-sized operation found implementation to 
be relatively straightforward: Anonymous.  
245 M4, M7, M9. For example, ‘What categories they should be... how they should be classified 
and just actually going out and doing all the analysis to make to submit the reports and their 
required. I think that caused quite a bit… a lot of concern’: M7, and another, ‘Some companies 
may have 15 mining lease tenements they’re operating on, all contiguous. So, for each 
tenement, they’re submitting MRF data, AER, Part 4 Environmental Conditions Report, Part 5 
Prescribed Premises Licences…’: M4.  
246 M1, M7, M9. 
247 The compliance rate in the previous year, 2014-15 was 98.1 per cent: Department of Mines 
and Petroleum (WA), above n 237, 2. 
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separately, and partly due to the multiplicity of reporting required for each 
tenement.248 As one interviewee explained, because the MRF was based solely on 
disturbances to land granted under the Mining Act, where there were multiple 
disturbances in the same project on different types of leases, or where part of the 
project did not fall under the Mining Act, there was substantial complexity in 
completing the necessary reporting. 249 This problem was evident for large 
operations with multiple tenements and overlapping land tenure,250 which made 
assigning specific disturbance to the corresponding authority problematic.251  
Some interviewees had encountered a possible unforeseen consequence of the 
operation of the MRF, being the difficulty of completing reporting obligations in 
respect of sites with historic disturbances which are currently tenements for other 
purposes. 252  An interviewee noted this frequently occurred in mature mining 
regions such as the WA Goldfields, particularly where minerals co-exist.253  
Under these circumstances, the nature of previous works and the chain of title and 
tenure may be poorly documented, and it may not always be evident whether a 
current tenement owner has a rehabilitation liability for a disturbance caused, 
since the disturbance may be the result of a previous owner’s activity. Therefore, 
interviewees had found that some clients have had to examine the historic chain 
of ownership of the tenement to determine whether such liability existed, or 
whether there was a break in the chain, which would result in liability for historic 
disturbances reverting to the State.254  
                                                 
248 M1, M3, M4, M6, M7.  
249 ‘The difficulty we had was the tenure system… we would operate under multiple forms of 
land tenure. And because the way the mining tenure system works, you can have a mining 
tenement that sits over the top of a Land Administration Act tenure… and other companies 
operating in the area. There could be pastoral tenure as well, so actually calculating what piece 
of disturbance was done under what authority was difficult.’: Anonymous. 
250 In addition to the Mining Act 1978 (WA), land may be granted under the Land Administration 
Act 1997 (WA), Petroleum and Geothermal Energy Resources Act 1967 (WA) or Petroleum 
Pipelines Act 1969 (WA). 
251 Anonymous. 
252 M5, M7. 
253 M7. 
254 ‘Some companies have had to look through the historic chain to see whether they might have 




Although the MRF Regulations indicate that land disturbed under a previous 
mining authorisation is usually exempt from the MRF in respect of those 
disturbances, 255  and therefore tenement holders were not liable for historical 
disturbances,256  the confusion remains,257  despite the DMP’s efforts to clarify 
this.258  
As the minerals extracted change over time, 259  technology advancement will 
allow for better processing of lower grade ore, and extraction of multiple minerals 
from a single orebody. Therefore, increasing challenges will emerge as WA 
progresses to a mature mining state. As one interviewee identified, it may not 
always be clear which disturbance was a result of which activity, an issue which 
interviewees noted required further clarification.260 
Following the introduction of the MRF, the majority of UPBs were released. 
While this was supposedly based on a risk assessment by the DMP, in accordance 
the DMP guidelines, 261  some interviewees perceived a lack of clarity and 
transparency surrounding the criteria for the release of bonds,262 with one who 
considered the release of bonds to be arbitrary. 263  However, the latest MRF 
Annual Report shows release of approximately 97 per cent of bonds, 264 which 
                                                 
255 Mining Rehabilitation Fund Regulations 2013 (WA) sch 1 cl 2. 
256 Hunt, Kavenagh and Hunt, above n 119, 368. 
257 M5, M7. 
258 Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), above n 125, 7. 
259 For example, the mineral lithium is currently in high demand: David Stringer, ‘Ground zero 
for lithium: Electric cars spark a new boom for Australian miners’, Sydney Morning Herald 
(online), 26 October 2017 < http://www.smh.com.au/business/mining-and-resources/ground-
zero-for-lithium-electric-cars-spark-a-new-boom-for-australian-miners-20171025-
gz8dgy.html>.  
260 M5, M7. 
261 Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), above n 111. 
262 For an in-house lawyer in the process of purchasing a mine during the MRF’s optional period, 
uncertainty around the return of bonds meant that the purchaser preferred to conduct the sale 
under the bond system, where they had more confidence of getting their replacement bonds 
released: Anonymous. 
263 ‘Our bonds were released on a tenement by tenement basis, and in no particular order… it was 
trickle-fed so it was a bit odd.’: Anonymous. 
264 The DMP noted that for tenements subject to the MRF, over $1 billion of bonds had been 
released, whereas only $35 million had been retained: Department of Mines and Petroleum 
(WA), above n 237, 5.  
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suggests that this was a transitory concern, and any remaining issue is relatively 
small and isolated in nature. 
(c) Concluding Remarks 
Overall, interviewee responses about the effect of the MRF on the industry were 
overwhelmingly positive, with the return of bonds perceived as a significant 
financial benefit, and the MRF being lower cost for industry compared to the 
UPB system. The MRF was also perceived as both financially and 
administratively efficient. To some, the MRF was also a fairer system to make the 
entire industry take responsibility for those operators who failed to meet their 
obligations.265  
While some increase in the compliance and reporting burden was detected, 
interviewees did not raise any critical issues or concerns which would adversely 
affect the industry, or result in a reduction of mining activity within the State. 
This signifies that from the industry perspective, Evaluation Principle 1, being the 
avoidance of unnecessary harm to the industry, had been achieved.266 
Given the overwhelmingly positive response, it raises the issue of whether the 
State had gone further than necessary, and the MRF as a mining securities system 
was weighted too heavily in industry’s favour at the expense of the State and 
other stakeholders, to whom the other Evaluation Principles would have greater 
relevance. 
2    Effect on the State  
The effect of the MRF on the State was the subject of a wider range of views. 
Most interviewees commented on the media attention the MRF received because 
of Ellendale,267 which had highlighted the potential for a significant unfunded 
liability to revert to the State following an operator’s entry into administration.268  
                                                 
265 M3, M4. ‘There should be an industry wide burden… [Where] everybody contributes to the 
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266 Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), above n 31, 12. See Appendix A for an excerpt of 
the Evaluation Principles, including the Principal Objective. 
267 M2, M3, M4, M5, M9, M10. One stated, ‘they totally stuffed up Ellendale’: M3. 
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costs’, ABC (online), 27 January 2017 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-01-27/minister-
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The State government appears to have a largely positive view of the operation of 
the MRF to date, with the MRF receiving the Premier’s Award. 269  However, 
some interviewees raised concerns, particularly around the MRF’s sufficiency to 
reduce the State’s financial exposure for rehabilitation obligations.270 
(a) Funds 
The primary purpose of the MRF as a mining securities system was to secure 
adequate funds to provide the State with greater assurance to meet the State’s 
unfunded liability for abandoned mine rehabilitation.271 Thus, key elements to its 
success or failure are the adequacy of the quantum of funds held, and also 
whether the funds can be accessed in a timely manner to be used appropriately. 
The State government anticipates that the MRF will eventually eliminate all 
taxpayer exposure to the risk of unfunded rehabilitation liabilities. 272 
(i) Access to Funds 
Rehabilitation work carried out under the MRF for abandoned sites is paid 
directly by the fund itself, and not out of general State revenue, which would be 
subject to State budget requirements and reviews.273 Some interviewees valued 
highly this separation of the MRF from state finances, as it enabled the 
development of long-term work programs to rehabilitate abandoned mines and 
legacy sites.274  
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long term, and whether it really is a cost shifting from a miner to the State.’: M9. 
271 Western Australia, Legislative Assembly, 15 August 2012, 5011 (Colin Barnett, Premier). 
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mines. It will diminish the annual financial operating burden on resource industry participants, 
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273 The MRF is a special purpose account under the Financial Management Act 2006 (WA) 
administered by the DMP with the dedicated purpose of rehabilitating abandoned mine sites: 
Explanatory Memorandum, Mining Rehabilitation Fund Bill 2012 (WA) 1. 
274 M1, M3. 
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Although the MRF’s principal is restricted to mine sites held by tenement holders 
that have contributed to the Fund, in the event of a mine site abandonment, the 
State is not limited to that tenement holder’s levy contributions.275 The State’s 
access to the full value of the MRF pool was identified as a significant advantage 
over the previous mining securities system,276 where the State could only claim 
against the specific UPB allocated to that tenement.277  
One interviewee encountered issues with the UPB system during the purchase of 
tenements, when the opposing party went into administration, reasoning ‘[the] 
bond is never assigned, and you just end up with this mess. At least with the 
MRF, the State seems to have more involvement and will have easier access to 
funds if required’.278 
The MRF’s pooled nature allows the interest earned by the Fund to be expended 
on legacy mines, meaning that the capital held provides significant additional 
value to the State.279 This was a key advantage noted by White et al,280 who 
acknowledged the inability of a bond system to generate a comparable funding 
pool for legacy sites.281 
Several interviewees identified that the dedicated source of ongoing revenue 
through the interest earned on the MRF has enabled the DMP to achieve positive 
outcomes in respect of the State’s legacy of abandoned mine sites.282 One of these 
outcomes was the Abandoned Mines Policy,283 which is enabling the State to 
                                                 
275 ‘... [the State has] the value of the pool. And that was never the case before. [The State] would 
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276 M2, M5, M6, M8. 
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281 Ibid. 
282 M1, M2, M4, M6, M8. 
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begin addressing some of the liabilities and public safety issues that have been 
created by legacy sites. through undertaking site clean-up works.284 
All interviewees agreed that the MRF worked as expected on Ellendale by 
providing the DMP with immediate access to funds to ‘undertake any necessary 
works at the site to ensure the area is safe, stable and non-polluting’.285 One 
interviewee rationalised, ‘the MRF is built to cover circumstances such as 
Ellendale where the company does not fully comply with their rehabilitation 
obligations… [the site] has been made safe and is ready to go again in the right 
economic circumstances’,286  reflecting the DMP’s position.287  As interviewees 
articulated, under the previous mining securities system, it would have been 
difficult to gain rapid access to funds from a company in administration, and 
without the MRF, Ellendale would have resulted in public risk.  
(ii) Financial Assurance for the State 
Parliamentary debates and media commentary have raised concerns that 
discharging security bonds would mean that the State would not be able to hold 
miners to their environmental obligations.288 Despite acknowledgement that the 
MRF applied to Ellendale led to an overall better outcome for the State than the 
previous UPB system might have, several interviewees expressed reservations 
about the adequacy of the MRF to fully cover the State’s liability,289 which was 
also reflected in media commentary.290 
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Coolgardie, and Elverdton Dump near Ravensthorpe: Department of Mines, Industry 
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To several interviewees, the introduction of the MRF resulted in a decrease in 
financial assurance for the State,291 following the release of bonds to miners that 
complied with the MRF.292 The concern was that since the State no longer holds 
substantial bonds, taxpayers are left to assume an increased level of risk, 293 
particularly in cases of operator insolvency, with the potential for a future 
increase in the tax burden.294  
This concern was exemplified by the State’s release of bonds to a ‘risky 
proposition’ such as Ellendale,295 with interviewees commenting the release of 
bonds comprehensively across the industry as premature, or a ‘mistake’.296 The 
concern was that the State may have gone too far and fast in releasing 
performance bonds, and would be left without adequate funds if situations similar 
to Ellendale reoccurred. This concern was also raised by Sommer and Gardner,297 
and White et al, who identified a ‘significant risk’ to the State in the event of 
multiple operator insolvencies or mine abandonments.298  
Without a bond at risk, there was a reduction in any disincentive for miners to 
abandon their environmental obligations, once a site was no longer profitable.299 
Ward also identified this risk, noting that without any UPB, there was no 
commercial imperative for the operator to retain the tenement. 300  This risk 
appears significant, given that around 75 per cent of all mines closing in Australia 
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do so before the end of their planned operating life.301 An interviewee identified 
the challenge in these circumstances is the inability for the State to require a 
private company to set aside money for environmental rehabilitation.302 
The MRF places the risk of unrefunded rehabilitation onto the whole mining 
industry, but, as Ward suggests, it does not prevent an individual operator from 
avoiding rehabilitation liabilities in cases of insolvency, dissolution, or other 
failures to meet rehabilitation obligations.303 The State has made amendments to 
the MRF Act to allow the State to recover costs from operators to minimise the 
potential for mine operators to avoid bearing the costs of rehabilitation. 304 
However, such cost recovery attempt would likely be futile in a situation of 
operator insolvency, as there may be no assets remaining to recover. 
Some interviewees did not believe that the MRF struck the right balance between 
the industry and the environment,305 and supported the use of bonds, either in full, 
or limited extent, for operators deemed to be at increased risk. While one 
advocated the retention of the UPB system to cover the full rehabilitation 
liability,306 another suggested combining the MRF with an increase in bonds as a 
mine approaches closure,307  a modification of the hybrid model Sommer and 
Gardner proposed.308  
One interviewee believed the absence of a general requirement for UPBs was 
inappropriate,309 making comparison to the Queensland mining securities system, 
                                                 
301 David Laurence, ‘Establishing a sustainable mining operation: an overview’ (2011) 19(2) 
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which currently requires bonds.310  The Queensland Treasury Corporation also 
recently recommended against emulating the MRF, preferring the option of 
partial retention of bonds. 311 The same interviewee suggested that industry should 
contribute to the MRF, in addition to bonds (and royalties), in recognition of the 
‘historical bad practice’ in respect of abandoned mine sites,312 although others 
viewed this as effectively imposing an obligation on the entire industry to take 
responsibility for recalcitrant miners.313 However, as the DMP identified in its 
2008 review of bond rates, with rehabilitation costs increasing, to be effective, the 
bonds would have had to be not just retained, but significantly increased over 
previous levels.314  
Ward also observed that the structure of the MRF did not incentivize any 
rehabilitation beyond the legal minimum, since it was based on the rehabilitation 
obligation at the point the levy becomes payable, unlike a potential bond 
refund.315 However, White et al emphasised that both bonds and a fund, alone had 
inherent limitations, and neither sufficiently incentivised rehabilitation,316 and like 
Sommer and Gardner, supported a combination of both bonds and a fund. 
Some interviewees suggested the concern over the DMP’s release of bonds was 
exacerbated by the economic downturn, and the resulting increased potential for 
smaller operations to shut down and abandon their liabilities,317 mirroring media 
reports and concerns from environmental groups.318  
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To some interviewees, there was an unrealistic media or public expectation 
surrounding Ellendale, that the entire site would be rehabilitated,319 and that the 
MRF would be required to provide the full Rehabilitation Liability Estimate 
(‘RLE’) of $40 million, perhaps reflecting a poor understanding of the intention 
of the MRF as a mining securities system. While Ellendale’s RLE was set at $40 
million, this was not the amount that would be expended. Interviewees reasoned 
that, since Ellendale remained a viable resource to develop, requiring complete 
rehabilitation to its final landform would be futile.320  
Other interviewees remained sceptical. One remarked that while a new purchaser 
may acquire the site, this may only defer the issue. ‘There comes a finite point 
that the resource will be exhausted… they’re going to be stuck with a very big 
hole to rehabilitate and no money to do it… and just walk away’. 321  The 
rehabilitation liability would then again revert to the State. 
The Minster retained the existing right under the Mining Act to impose bonds.322 
There were divergent views among interviewees about the extent to which this 
should be done, reflecting the tension between the various objectives of the MRF, 
seeking to obtain adequate financial assurance for the State, whilst also not 
unnecessarily restricting mining development.323 
To some, a benefit of the MRF was to enable industry to take accountability of 
rehabilitation outcomes. 324  Others were opposed to a wider requirement for 
UPBs.325 Reflecting upon the potential widespread use of bonds, one interviewee 
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27/minister-moves-to-reopen-ellendale-diamond-mine-and-avoid-costs/8217874>. 
319 M2, M3, M6, M8. 
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commented that a more stringent UPB requirement was likely to make miners less 
self-reliant in complying with their environmental obligations.326  
For several interviewees, the application of bonds should be limited to situations 
where a miner demonstrates a pattern of non-compliance,327 or as the DMP states, 
a ‘high risk of the rehabilitation liability reverting to the State’. 328  One 
interviewee cautioned that the Minister’s discretion to apply bonds should be 
applied sparingly, to avoid diluting a significant benefit of the MRF, which to this 
interviewee was the release of capital to miners. 329  
Some interviewees emphasised that the MRF was designed as a ‘long-term 
proposition’ rather than a quick fix, and would require time to accumulate 
sufficient funds.330 Another noted that the MRF was designed to manage, not 
eliminate abandonment risk,331 with the pooling of funds spreading the risk. This 
was also acknowledged by the DMP, who observed that while any amount less 
than the total closure costs of all mines would inevitably result in outstanding 
risk, ‘it was not reasonable to assume that all mine sites in WA would fail, and 
fail simultaneously’.332 
The Auditor General, in a follow-up review (‘2014 Review’), concluded that the 
State’s potential exposure to liability if miners failed to meet their rehabilitation 
obligations had decreased because of the implementation of the MRF.333  The 
2014 Review emphasised that this was due to the creation of a special purpose 
account that can be applied to any abandoned site, rather than being allocated to a 
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specific tenement.334 It further noted that the retirement of bonds was occurring 
appropriately in line with DMP policies.335 
However, revenue from the levy had been lower than forecast. 336  The $28.3 
million income for the year to 2017 compares to $58 million forecast in the 2014-
15 State Budget papers.337 The Auditor General therefore raised the possibility 
that the current rate of one per cent may require review and increase in future 
years.338 The DMP is currently undertaking a review of the MRF contribution 
rates.339 
If multiple mine abandonments resulted in greater than anticipated expenditure 
from the MRF, and the fund was not adequate to meet them, the contribution rate 
could be increased, or the method of calculation changed, to increase the funds 
available. Since the rate and calculation methodology are set out in the MRF 
Regulations rather than the MRF Act,340 the State is able to do this easily. 
To some interviewees, this ability to adjust rates not only enables the government 
to account for fluctuations in risks,341 but also to address behaviours and ensure 
that the industry is ‘self-regulating or self-managing risk’.342 This was the State 
government’s intention to move towards a ‘risk-based’ regulatory framework.343 
However, interviewees raised the difficulty of raising the levy without 
discouraging mining activity, noting the potential effect on the industry and the 
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resultant effect on the State and community.344 As such, increasing the MRF levy 
significantly may not be a viable option. Further, as Sommer and Gardner 
cautioned, a substantial increase without any apparent correlation between the 
levy and the benefit to the tenement holder may risk the levy being perceived as a 
tax.345  
Sommer and Gardner observed that while the Fund is building up, the State 
remains exposed to significant risk, and suggested that this risk could have been 
mitigated by adopting a hybrid model, retaining partial bonds, at least as an 
interim measure.346 While the 2014 Report also noted the risks in the transition 
period, the Auditor General concluded that overall, the MRF had already reduced 
the risk to the State.347 
While a flat levy of one per cent was a simpler mechanism than initially proposed 
in the DMP Review, it was considered to provide an appropriate balance between 
ensuring the equality of the fund, and achieving administrative simplicity.348  
The government appears satisfied with the current rate at which the MRF is 
increasing. During the year to 30 June 2017, the Fund received levies of $28.3 
million, and had a balance of $92.4 million,349 suggesting it had funds sufficient 
to handle several Ellendale-sized rehabilitation projects. While admitting the 
possibility of further mine abandonments, some interviewees were confident of 
the risk decreasing as the Fund balance increases.350 
(iii) State Agreement Mines 
Operators may hold land under various systems of land tenure,351 among which 
State Agreements were the area of most relevance to the MRF. The MRF may 
apply to tenure held pursuant to State Agreements if the tenure is prescribed as a 
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‘mining authorisation’.352 However, since 2012 there has been no tenure held 
pursuant to a State Agreement that has been prescribed as a mining 
authorisation.353 Further, while State Agreement mines can participate in the MRF 
voluntarily, none have done so.354 Therefore, none of the State Agreement mines 
have contributed to the MRF.  
Although bonds can be retained for high-risk projects and projects not subject to 
the MRF Act, including State Agreement mines,355 the Auditor General noted that 
this seldom occurred.356 Ward perceived this as a significant source of inequality 
among operators, and suggested Parliament reconsider.357  
Despite most State Agreement mines having no UPB, they do not make payments 
to the MRF, representing a significant loss of potential funding. 358  While the 
Auditor General noted no change in the level of risk to the State since 2011,359 the 
2014 Report was published before Ellendale’s abandonment and the insolvency of 
Yabulu in Queensland.  
Interviewees perceived the effect of the MRF on State Agreement operations to 
be minor, and the fact that they were not required to contribute to the MRF 
concerned several interviewees, who perceived it as ‘unfair’.360 They commented 
that State Agreement operations, although relatively few, were often the largest 
projects, and therefore represented the State’s greatest risk of large-scale 
unfunded rehabilitation,361 with no mechanism to provide the State with financial 
assurance against unfunded rehabilitation obligations. 
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While State Agreement operations may have ancillary tenements362 outside the 
State Agreement area which may have been Mining Act tenure,363 in these limited 
occurrences, the level of disturbance, and the resulting contribution the MRF is 
likely to be insignificant. 364  An in-house lawyer of a State Agreement mine 
described that, contrary to initial expectations, the charge incurred for the MRF 
was small relative to the size of their project.365 The interviewee noted that as a 
State Agreement mine, they were calculating and paying the MRF only on small 
disturbances to neighbouring tenements, while the nearby mine itself, which had 
far greater rehabilitation obligations, was unaffected.  
State Agreements are a central tool of current State mineral policy, 366  and 
represent a legal agreement between the government and the operator. Therefore, 
the MRF could not be unilaterally imposed on the State Agreement holder unless 
they agreed to renegotiate the terms of their agreement, which was unlikely to be 
commercially attractive to them. Although Ward asserted that ‘there would be 
value in creating a model of liability that all miners are subject to’, she also noted 
that any attempt to amend State Agreements could be perceived as a threat to the 
security of tenure that they are designed to safeguard.367 
While the State has indicated that they have no intention to renegotiate State 
Agreements as part of the implementation of the MRF,368  some interviewees 
maintained that the potential to do so at a later date existed. Indeed, Parliament 
has left open the possibility of their future inclusion, through the identification in 
the MRF Regulations,369 and the MRF Act.370section 4 of the MRF Act. Gorey et 
                                                 
362 For example, for a pipeline or an accommodation camp. 
363 Which have been granted pursuant to the Mining Act 1978 (WA). 
364 M1, M4, M5, M7, M9, M10. 
365 ‘For a company like mine, it was really small the amount we paid into the MRF even though 
our footprint was huge.’: Anonymous. 
366 Hillman, above n 121, 295. 
367 Ward, above n 300, 482. 
368 Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 26 September 2012, 6547 
(Colin Barnett, Premier).  
369 Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 15 August 2012, 5011 
(Colin Barnett, Premier).  
370 Mining Rehabilitation Fund Act 2012 (WA) s 4. 
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al also observed that the drafting of the MRF Act allowed the deferral of the issue 
for future consideration.371  
Interestingly, interviewees revealed that the State has been requesting State 
Agreement tenement holders to report under the MRF without paying the levy.372 
Although it has been met with some cooperation from clients, interviewees noted 
that there has also been some resistance.373 
Other interviewees noted State Agreement mines as subject to a broad and all-
encompassing regulatory regime through their State Agreement and stringent 
environmental approvals,374 and were therefore highly regulated and not requiring 
further mining security.375 These rigorous requirements, which went beyond what 
the MRF would impose, are designed to reduce the risks posed by the operation 
of State Agreement mines.376  
One interviewee contended that the size of State Agreement operators, which 
includes the likes of BHP and Rio Tinto means that there is generally a lower risk 
of insolvency of the operator compared to smaller operators.377 However, Griffin 
Coal,378 a mine under the Collie State Agreementsand therefore not prescribed 
                                                 
371 Gorey et al, above n 40, 379. 
372 M4, M7, M10. Interviewees noted that the State was requesting data with reference to the 
MRF reporting categories relating to the level of disturbance, and what rehabilitation activities 
are being undertaken, so that the DMP has access to a complete data set for the entire State of 
the level of disturbance and rehabilitation. 
373 M4, M7. 
374 M1, M2, M7. 
375 ‘You can’t just make the simple solution [to] require them to contribute because they’re having 
an impact too… they’re subject to other regulatory requirements, in particular they often have 
requirements imposed under Part 4 of the EP Act [Part IV of the Environmental Protection Act 
1986 (WA) relates to “Proposals with significant impact on the environment”] that some of the 
other mining companies don’t have… and they’re subject to various other rigorous 
requirements… That’s why they might not be included in the MRF.’: M2. 
376 M2. 
377 ‘…BHP, Rio… the main ones. You know, is the State at as big a risk from that sort of 
companies than it is from some of the smaller operators? So the legal tool is there to manage 
the State’s liability’: M2. 
378 Collie Coal (Griffin) Agreement Act 1979 (WA). 
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tenements under the MRF Regulations, 379 entered into administration earlier this 
year for the second time, suggesting that some risk remains.380 
State Agreements generally do not cover mine closure or rehabilitation. One 
interviewee revealed that, ‘although the majority of the State Agreement mines 
will provide mine closure plans, they are provided voluntarily rather than 
necessarily because that requirement is under the Mining Act’. 381  Another 
interviewee observed that, as State Agreement mines reach the end of their mine 
life, ‘there will be a high level of reliance on the companies that operate them to 
undertake appropriate rehabilitation’.382 In these instances, the reliance may be 
primarily on their reputation, and desire for an amicable continuing relationship 
with the State government,383 rather than the legislation.  
Some interviewees conceded that the majority of mining operations under State 
Agreements are owned mostly by large corporations such as BHP and Rio Tinto 
with a publicly stated commitment to corporate and social responsibility,384 and a 
desire to avoid reputational risk. However, they are ultimately still primarily 
driven by commercial factors, with some interviewees asserting the need for 
legislative change to ensure appropriate action.385 
(b) State Operational Capacity 
Some interviewees viewed the MRF as instrumental in developing the State’s 
operational capacity to undertake rehabilitation. 386  They noted that with the 
previous UPB system, even if the funds were sufficient for rehabilitation work, 
the DMP lacked the personnel, equipment, and project and management skills 
                                                 
379 Only prescribed tenements are liable to pay the levy: Mining Rehabilitation Fund Act 2012 
(WA) s 4. 
380 Shannon Wood and David Prestipino, ‘Parent company of Collie miner Griffin Coal put into 





383 M3, M5, M10. 
384 M5. 
385 M1, M5. 
386 M2, M6, M8. 
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necessary to undertake the work. They noted that as a result of the MRF, the 
DMP now retains some specialist knowledge in this area within its workforce.387  
An interviewee explained that since the scale of the abandoned mines problem is 
still unknown, it is difficult for the State to assess where to spend the available 
funds. The interviewee noted that since the implementation of the MRF, the State 
has now been able to develop the capability to undertake the rehabilitation work, 
and, in doing so, is gaining experience in assessing the activity cost of mine 
rehabilitation or closure, against the available funds in the MRF.388 This firsthand 
experience will assist the State in understanding what they are requiring from 
mining companies in performing rehabilitation, which interviewees saw as 
potentially resulting in better outcomes across the mine closure framework, and 
increasing the State’s ability to monitor and enforce compliance.389  
However, one interviewee cautioned that this increased operational capacity to 
undertake rehabilitation resulted in increased exposure to risk for the State, and 
believed that it was essential that the DMP considers the desire to carry out 
required rehabilitation work against the need to avoid inadvertently increasing the 
State’s potential liability in a responsible and transparent way.390 There appears to 
have been relatively little consideration of this issue prior to the implementation 
of the MRF Act, although it could be reasoned that the purpose of the MRF 
Advisory Panel,391 is to manage such issues. 
(c) Disturbance Data  
To several interviewees, the MRF has created more transparency around 
rehabilitation and environmental obligations, through the additional reporting 
requirements.392 This was also noted by the Auditor General, who indicated that 
                                                 
387 M2, M6. 
388 M2. 
389 M2, M6, M8.  
390 ‘Since the State now has operational capacity to go in to an abandoned mine to rehabilitate or 
undertake works, there is a liability risk in relation doing those works for the State. The State 
needs to consider what liability they might be picking up and ensuring that they are managed 
carefully’: M2. 
391 The MRF Advisory Panel is established by Mining Rehabilitation Fund Act 2012 (WA) s 33. 
392 M2, M4, M6, M7, M10. 
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the quantity and quality of information available to the DMP had vastly improved 
due to the reporting processes implemented with the MRF.393 
In having a system for all tenement holders to report their disturbance data 
annually, 394  the MRF provided a clear system for determining the potential 
rehabilitation liabilities of a site, and therefore the residual liability to the State 
should the tenement holder fail to meet their rehabilitation obligations.395  
The disturbance data for all tenements is published by the DMP annually,396 and 
shows trends across the State, including the extent of progressive rehabilitation. 
Since the disturbance data reported is audited by the DMP, the DMP can be 
assured of its accuracy. One interviewee pointed out that amount of land 
disturbance across the State was information that the State did not have 
previously.397 Given the Auditor General’s previous criticism of the DMP’s poor 
records management and resulting lack of information available,398 this represents 
a significant benefit to the State.  
In an effect perhaps not anticipated at the inception of the MRF, interviewees 
found the increased reporting data beneficial for sale transactions of tenements or 
mining operations. 399  The data for a tenement on ground disturbance, 
rehabilitation, and the levy that has been paid in relation to that disturbance had 
been useful in carrying out the due-diligence process for clients acquiring 
tenement packages. 400  To some interviewees, the data was valuable, since 
knowledge of legislative non-compliance was essential for clients to factor in to 
                                                 
393 Office of the Auditor General Western Australia, above n 127, 6-7. 
394 Tenement holders are required to submit disturbance data in the Annual Environmental Report 
(AER) for the MRF levy to be generated. See above Chapter II(B)(1).  
395 M2, M6, M7, M8, M10. While this may be considered an unintended effect of the MRF, it 
remains consistent with Evaluation Principle 5. 
396 Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), above n 237, 4. 
397 M6. 
398 Auditor General Western Australia, above n 127, 19.  
399 M3, M7, M10. 
400 This information is available in the form of an Excel spreadsheet or an online ‘MRF 
Calculator’: Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), New calculator estimates MRF levy 




price risk in transactions. 401  While perhaps not initially intended, this is 
something the DMP now recognises.402 
 (d) Administration of the MRF 
To facilitate reporting under the MRF Act, the DMP introduced a new reporting 
system, Environmental Assessment and Regulatory System (‘EARS2’). 403 
Interviewees noted the MRF’s reliance on accurate licensing and titles 
information to operate effectively, meaning that an unsuccessful system 
implementation could jeopardise the entire MRF.404  
While recognising the challenges around the implementation of a new system, 
including the sheer volume of tenements and data that DMP had to process, one 
interviewee was surprised at how easy it was to get their bond back, commenting, 
‘I thought it would be a lot harder – there were no checks or balances’.405  
From another interviewee’s perspective, the fact that miners could get their bonds 
returned was a major selling point that generally attracted industry support, which 
assisted in a smoother transition to the new system and legislation.406 
(e) Concluding Remarks 
The impact on the State included both intended and unintended effects. 
Interviewees emphasised that the State cannot rely solely on the MRF for 
financial assurance, and should also be monitoring operators for indicators of 
financial difficulty to minimise the State’s potential liability. The MRF exists as 
an ‘insurance policy’ for where this does not occur successfully. Over time, the 
                                                 
401 M3, M7, M10. One interviewee explained that the data assists potential buyers to understand 
their potential exposure to the levy, since the levy is limited to the current year, and the buyer 
can adjust for in values. This increased transparency allows buyers to deal with the risks 
identified through the contract, or adjust the price accordingly: M10. 
402 Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), above n 400. 
403 See above Chapter II. 
404 M1, M5, M6, M8. The existing system which interviewees were referring to, was the 
Tengraph system, a spatial enquiry and mapping system displaying the position of WA mining 
tenements and petroleum titles in relation to other land information. It gives a current and 
accurate picture of land under mining activity and is used to determine ground that is available 






State is likely to improve in assessing potential problems, thereby minimising 
further occasions such as Ellendale.  
The creation of pooled funds to address legacy mines addressed an issue that the 
previous UPB mine securities system had neglected. However, the MRF’s design 
meant that it will take many years before the fund grew sufficiently to reach 
maximum effectiveness. As such, the MRF appears to be in the process of 
meeting its Principal Objective, although it remains too soon to determine 
whether this will be fully met. Furthermore, the pooled and accessible nature of 
the Fund meant it was also the best available approach to meet Evaluation 
Principle 3. 
The positives of the policy were commended by the Fraser Institute,407 which 
stated that the MRF was an innovative system compared to other mining 
jurisdictions, noting that in combination with WA’s mineral resources, the policy 
was attractive to investors, and that the reduction in ‘red tape’ resulted in the 
shortest gap between discovery and production among comparable 
jurisdictions,408 consistent with Evaluation Principle 1.  
State Agreement mines were noted as a gap in the mining securities system which 
remained unaddressed, as most were covered by neither bonds nor the MRF, and 
therefore perhaps represent the greatest obstacle to the Principal Objective being 
achieved. This was identified as an area requiring further reform, although the 
political appetite for this appears modest. 
Although the MRF was generally considered an improvement over the UPB 
mining security system, this may be largely a result of the inadequacies of the 
previous system, both administratively, and the fact that the bonds held were 
never sufficient to adequately undertake any modern rehabilitation.409 However, 
the experience of Ellendale suggests that there may still be a role for UPBs, and 
the MRF alone as a mining security system may not achieve the ideal balance 
between benefit to the industry, and mitigating risk to the State.  
                                                 
407 Fraser Institute, Fraser Institute Annual Survey of Mining Companies: 2015 (2015). 
408 Department of Premier and Cabinet, ‘WA rated the world’s top investment destination’ (Media 
Statement, 2 March 2016). 
409 Auditor General Western Australia, above n 127, 32. 
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3    Effect on the Environment 
Interviewees had mixed views on whether the MRF could, or should have any 
positive environmental effect, through encouraging progressive rehabilitation or 
other best practice. However, they noted that this was not necessarily its role, as 
the MRF acts as a safeguard for the wider environmental framework for mining 
operations. This framework includes a range of protections to ensure that 
directors meet their environmental obligations, although interviewees 
acknowledged that their effectiveness was limited, and improvement to the 
framework appeared necessary.  
(a) Environmental Practices 
To interviewees, the MRF levy, calculated based on the amount and type of 
ground disturbance has the effect of directing miners’ attention to their 
disturbance footprint. 410  The potential incentive to reduce the footprint, and 
thereby reduce their annual charge, was widely acknowledged by interviewees, 
who noted that it could encourage miners to reconsider whether they needed to 
clear new land, or minimise the size of the land they cleared, or to rehabilitate 
areas they no longer required.411 
However, interviewee opinions varied as to the extent that the MRF could achieve 
this. Several interviewees did not perceive the MRF as effective in encouraging 
better environmental practices, including progressive rehabilitation, and had not 
observed clients, or their mining operations modifying operational behaviour.412 
Some interviewees noted the potential value of the MRF to impact management 
behaviour, and the importance of the role of the Board of Directors as key 
decisionmakers.413 Despite a company’s stated commitment to rehabilitation, a 
few interviewees stated that it was often a ‘challenge’ to prioritise and have 
                                                 
410 M2, M3. 
411 This was reflected in Evaluation Principle 2, which included achieving good environmental 
practice, including greater use of progressive rehabilitation. 
412 M1, M4, M5, M9. 
413 M1, M4, M5, M6, M8. ‘The board [and] the directors of a company need to have some skin 
when it comes to progressive rehabilitation because they’re the ones that make the decision 
that whether there’s going to be finance or not.’: M4. 
59 
 
budget allocated to environmental activities such as progressive rehabilitation on 
site,414 which might be postponed in difficult economic times.  
Since the MRF levy is an expense item affecting a mine’s profitability, the levy 
has attracted wider management’s attention, rather than restricted to the 
environmental department.415 Management may start focussing on what can be 
done to reduce expenditure, and directors will be incentivised to allocate 
resources and finance to ensure that environmental practices achieve this, 
including progressive rehabilitation.416 
Whilst most interviewees questioned the ability of the MRF at the current levy 
rate to have any significant effect, one interviewee reported a shift in attitudes, 
observing that site environmental scientists have reported budget being allocated 
to progressive rehabilitation. However, in-house lawyers indicated that the money 
has been reinvested back into keeping operations going, performing further 
exploration and other works on site, rather than on progressive rehabilitation 
activity.417 
The practicality of progressive rehabilitation was cited as the most common 
limiting factor, particularly on an operating mine. 418  Although the MRF 
theoretically encourages progressive rehabilitation by incentivising miners to 
change the category or reduce the number of hectares under a disturbance 
category, the extent to which a mining operation can change its category 
meaningfully is limited by the commercial reality of mining and operational 
needs.419 The limiting factors interviewees broadly identified included the mineral 
type, mineral deposit, orebody and mining method.  
                                                 
414 M6, M8. 
415 M1, M5, M6. 
416 M1, M6. ‘[B]ecause the MRF is an annual levy and it’s coming across the Financial 
Controllers’ desk every year, there’s now been those conversations about how do we reduce 
this cost. Well the best way to reduce the cost is undertake progressive rehabilitation’: M6. 
417 Anonymous. 
418 M1, M2, M3, M7, M9. 
419 ‘There are technical barriers to progressive rehabilitation, that far exceed any barriers or 
incentives that the MRF propose’: M4. 
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Operators’ greatest focus would invariably be on finding new orebodies, and 
extracting them profitably. Production would always be a priority,420 to maximise 
returns to shareholders. This is reflected in recent research which suggested that 
rehabilitation obligations were not an area of focus or concern to senior mining 
executives, who were instead focused on production outcomes, resource 
availability, and tax matters.421 
Opportunities for progressive rehabilitation without compromising current or 
future production were perceived as limited and relatively insignificant,422 such as 
minor clearing for infrastructure or re-vegetation.423 The decision to progressive 
rehabilitate could adversely impact future operations, that often relied on pre-
existing infrastructure in mined areas.424  
Furthermore, while clearly delineated and homogenous orebodies were accepted 
as easier to rehabilitate progressively,425 for most mines, such as hard rock open 
pits, the nature of the deposit often made progressive rehabilitation unrealistic. 
Since different orebody concentration or mineralization could be profitable at 
different stages, it was essential to operators that rehabilitation work did not 
interfere with the ability to mine lower grade ore,426 or co-existing minerals.427 
This effect was compounded by the cyclical nature of the industry, where 
commodity price fluctuations or improvements in technology could render areas 
such as tailings or waste rock, which were previously considered unprofitable as 
                                                 
420 M1, M2, M4, M9. 
421 PwC, How do you know if you lead or follow? Mining benchmarking insight report (2014); 
Tony Boyd and Michael Smith, ‘What our top CEOs expect in 2015’, Australian Financial 
Review (online), 6 January 2015 <http://www.afr.com/business/what-our-top-ceos-expect-in-
2015-20150105-12iflq>. 
422 M1, M3, M5, M9. 
423 One interview noted that the mine planning team did not include any mine closure specialists, 
which suggests that planning for rehabilitation and closure was seen as relatively unimportant: 
M1. 
424 ‘[W]ell we need to keep using this infrastructure... So the cost of building new infrastructure... 
you might say well, we don't want to rehab[ilitate] all this area because we've got 
infrastructure there we want to use and there's a pit nearby’: M1. 
425 M4, M7, M9. 
426 Lower grade ore can include mined and unmined ore. Mined ore are often located in waste 
rock or tailings, while unmined ore in situ. 
427 M7, M9. 
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viable opportunities. 428  Therefore, an overenthusiastic focus on progressive 
rehabilitation could prevent an operator from reopening or acquiring and 
exploiting a previously mined resource in the appropriate economic situation.  
These limitations were consistent with the findings of the Queensland Audit 
Office, which noted that very little progressive rehabilitation was occurring.429 
Similarly, Lamb noted widespread concern that managers delay rehabilitation 
rather than progressively undertaking it as mining progresses.430  
The MRF’s Yearly Report indicated an average of four per cent increase in ‘land 
under rehabilitation’ annually.431 There were opposing views about the reasons 
for this. While some suggested that the decrease reflected better environmental 
practices such as progressive rehabilitation, or minimising the disturbance 
footprint,432 others indicated that disturbance figures could decrease, not because 
of rehabilitation activity, but through better reporting, including attributing 
disturbance to historical mining, allowing miners to reduce the sum paid,433 or 
legal advice on how to minimise their levy.434  
Several interviewees believed that the MRF contribution at its current rate of one 
per cent, being far lower than the cost of the capital needed to rehabilitate, was 
insufficient financial incentive to motivate behavioural change,435 and a greater 
incentive was required for operators to progressively rehabilitate.436 
                                                 
428 M5, M7, M9. 
429 Queensland Audit Office, Environmental regulation of the resources and waste industries, 
Report No 15 (2013) 45. 
430 David Lamb, Peter Erskine and Andrew Fletcher, ‘Widening gap between expectations and 
practice in Australian minesite rehabilitation’ (2015) 16(3) Ecological Management & 
Restoration 186, 191. 
431 Data as at 21 September 2016: Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), above n 237, 4. 
432 M6, M8. 
433 M5, M9. 
434 An interviewee revealed that they ‘… were probably too honest to begin with’, and may have 
initially over-reported the area disturbed, adding, ‘you pay attention a little bit more detail as 
the screws come down in tighter economic times to make sure that those numbers are 
accurate,’ which resulted in reduced disturbance even though no rehabilitation work had been 
done.’: Anonymous. 
435 ‘[I]t’s not a big enough number to motivate someone unless they're quite small’: M5. 
436 ‘There’s no drive[r] from an operator to do it. There just needs to be something more creative 
done to try and encourage rehab[ilitation]’: M5. 
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The most rudimentary method to achieve this would be an increase in the MRF 
levy. While a minority were in favour of this, interviewees were mindful of the 
need to avoid deterring mining activity, or jeopardising the industry, 437 
particularly given the State’s reliance on royalties, and likely opposition from 
industry lobbyists. 438  They considered other possible incentives, such as 
extending licenses,439 or allowing operators to who have paid in for some years to 
use a percentage of their accumulated payments to fund their site rehabilitation.440  
Other interviewees believed that providing a disincentive to clear land at the 
outset would be more effective than encouraging rehabilitation,441 particularly in 
conjunction with mine closure plans to encourage better mine planning 
practices.442 As interviewees noted, 443 attributing a cost to having land cleared 
throughout the mine’s operating life could encourage mine management to plan 
the project within as small a footprint as possible, particularly given the 
differential rates attached to different types of disturbance.444  Again, a higher 
MRF rate might be necessary to significantly incentivise this. 
However, one interviewee stressed that the link between the level of disturbance 
and the MRF charge was not necessarily a deliberate attempt to incentivise 
rehabilitation, stating, ‘it may work like that a little, but it is not intended to be the 
main objective’. 445 The primary incentive to rehabilitate was intended to come 
from other compliance requirements, which operate in combination with the 
MRF.446 Others noted that the MRF should not force companies to undertake 
                                                 
437 M2, M5.  This was reflected in Evaluation Principle 1.  
438 M1, M2, M5, M6, M8. 
439 ‘If they can link the MRF to allow miners to keep assets for longer so long as they can be 
shown to be actively doing rehabilitation, rather than just reporting the same numbers every 
year… that might be good.’: M5. 
440 M4, M5. 
441 M1, M6. 
442 ‘It encourages better mine planning in the first place… don’t disturb something until you need 
it…and the MRF also encourages that because… if you disturb it, you’ll have to pay the levy 
on it.’: M6. 
443 M1, M6, M8. 
444 See Appendix C. 
445 M2. 
446 M2, M3, M7. 
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progressive rehabilitation, as it was important that they retained the flexibility to 
operate their mines commercially.447  
Despite the commercial necessity to retain operational flexibility, some 
interviewees believed that it was feasible to manage disturbance on an ongoing 
basis to effectively reduce the amount of land for which the highest levy is 
paid,448 with the desirable effect of managing the rehabilitation throughout the life 
of the mine. 
One interviewee detected greater resource allocation to progressive rehabilitation 
on some mining operations.449 Others acknowledged the potential to encourage 
behavioural change,450 but one interviewee’s experience was that because there 
was no incentive overall, the mine planning process remained unchanged.451 
There was a common view that the dominant perception of the MRF as ‘just a 
levy’ within the industry, and an annual cost of doing business to be paid 
annually, prompted miners to do the ‘bare minimum’, 452  which Ward also 
noted. 453  Some interviewees suggested that an model with indirect financial 
incentives could encourage miners to view the MRF more constructively, and 
encourage better rehabilitation, particularly if there was an opportunity to use the 
MRF to fund research on innovative rehabilitation techniques.454  
One interviewee pointed out that the binary nature of the categorisation of land 
under rehabilitation,455 where it was either disturbed or not, was a disincentive, 
and that a sliding scale of levy associated with the level of disturbance could be 
more effective.456 However, the interviewee acknowledged that assessing between 
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different categories would raise the question of how the assessment of categories 
would be monitored, thereby adding administrative complexity and cost.457  
One interviewee indicated that such incentive scheme would have to be linked to 
specific objectives in the mine closure plan,458 analogous to Ward’s proposition of 
‘post-production licences’ under which mines approaching the end of their 
producing life would pay a reduced MRF or receive a refund if rehabilitation is 
performed.459 
Interviewees had vastly different views about whether it was necessary or 
desirable to encourage progressive rehabilitation. Some others believed that, 
while the MRF legislation does not mandate progressive rehabilitation, it was 
intended to encourage it.460 Others, however did not believe it was the intent of 
the MRF to encourage mine rehabilitation, and that it was not an effective tool for 
doing so.461 Instead, the MRF existed to provide a ‘safety net’ for the State where 
rehabilitation does not occur. 462  Another noted that requiring immediate and 
complete rehabilitation would adversely affect the industry’s commercial 
viability.463  
One interviewee asserted that the environmental impacts of mining should be 
dealt with through penalizing operators through the Mining Act for breaches of 
conditions, not through paying more into the Fund, as the MRF was ‘not the tool 
to ensure companies do the right thing’.464 This was consistent with the DMP’s 
view, which emphasised that the mining securities system existed to allow ready 
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access to funds, rather than as a tool to enforce compliance with other 
legislation.465  
Progressive rehabilitation was included as good environmental practice in the 
DMP’s Evaluation Criteria,466 and the incentive for progressive rehabilitation was 
highlighted in various other DMP literature.467 However, some interviewees did 
not think the overall objective was to require or encourage rehabilitation to an 
extent that would meaningfully benefit the State or environment.468 For them, 
encouraging rehabilitation was part of the wider mine closure framework. 469 
Specifically, it was part of the approvals process, which included the requirement 
to prepare mine closure plans. 
An interviewee cautioned that progressive rehabilitation does not prevent 
problems if a site is abandoned.470 A progressively rehabilitated abandoned site 
would still leave the State exposed to a rehabilitation liability for the 
rehabilitation of open pits or tailings storage facilities.  
One interviewee maintained that UPBs were the appropriate mechanism to 
prevent these issues, reasoning that their use would encourage progressive 
rehabilitation if it was subject to best practice methodology, and annual reviews 
of operations.471 The interviewee also noted that Queensland had such a system, 
under which operators could reduce their bond by putting land under 
rehabilitation.472  
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Like Ward,473 some interviewees perceived the MRF as weaker than UPBs in 
encouraging compliance with rehabilitation obligations, although equally, 
bonding was far from being a complete solution, particularly given the inadequate 
level of bonds previously held, and the negative impact that requiring full 
financial assurance through bonds would have on the industry.474  
To Morrison et al, due to the large number of operational mines in WA under the 
Mining Act, the MRF could develop into a fund of sufficient size to meet the 
primary objective without putting an excessive financial burden on individual 
mining companies, a reflection of the State’s well-established industry.475 
The DMP assessed UPBs as more effective than the MRF in achieving 
progressive rehabilitation, as bond amounts were able to be amended in 
accordance with new mining development and rehabilitation performance 
following completion of annual reports by the company and inspection by the 
department.476 However, the DMP had considered full UPBs to be overly onerous 
for the industry.477 Meanwhile, the Queensland Audit Office noted that, despite 
Queensland’s move towards full bonds, there was still a $1.9 billion shortfall 
between liabilities and funds held,478 suggesting that a UPB system should not be 
seen as a panacea. 
(b) Environmental Compliance 
The MRF does not eliminate operators’ obligations in relation to mine 
rehabilitation and closure. Accordingly, interviewees reported that neither they 
nor their clients experienced any drastic change in decision making on 
rehabilitation issues.479 The DMP stated that the MRF was intended to form part 
of an improved system for compliance under the Mining Act, with the Option 
Paper highlighting that a priority for the State was ensuring that operators do not 
                                                 
473 Ward, above n 300, 468. 
474 Therefore, a system of full bonds would not be consistent with Evaluation Principle 1. 
475 Morrison-Saunders et al, above n 28, 125. 
476 Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), above n 31, 4, 12. 
477 Ibid 9. 
478 Queensland Audit Office, above n 147, 4. 
479 ‘I don’t think anyone’s changed the way they operate because of the MRF’: M5. 
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evade their mine closure obligations.480 An interviewee observed that, while in 
recent years, the State’s focus had been on approval of new projects, the 
industry’s increasing maturity should require a greater emphasis on enforcing 
compliance from existing operators.481 
While interviewees generally believed the MRF was designed primarily as a 
‘safety-net’ for when rehabilitation obligations are not met, 482  there was 
recognition of some indirect consequences in respect of compliance with the 
wider environmental and mine closure framework.  
To some interviewees, the MRF was more than a levy, 483 because it increased the 
DMP’s ability to secure compliance and manage miners’ conduct. 484  An 
interviewee explained that, as tenement holders are now required to report on 
disturbance under the MRF Act, the tenement holder and the DMP would be 
expected to reconcile this against the disturbance figure in their environmental 
approvals to ensure they remain compliant.485  
Interviewees described the previous UPB system, and the ability to withhold 
retirement of the bonds, as an effective tool to ensure compliance with 
rehabilitation obligations.486 UPBs become far less widespread under the MRF, 
but the Minister retains the discretion to impose UPBs in addition to the 
operator’s MRF obligation. Further, with rehabilitation no longer dependent on 
the release of UPBs, it is no longer entirely within the DMP’s responsibility and 
influence to determine an appropriate rehabilitation outcome for a mine site.487 
                                                 
480 Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), above n 31, 13. See Appendix A for an excerpt of 
the Evaluation Principles. 
481 M3. 
482 M2, M10. 
483 M6, M8. ‘It's not a compliance tool per se, but I think it’s a mistake to say that it’s not a 
compliance tool. It wouldn’t be right to say that Mining Act securities are not compliance 
tools, because that’s what they were used for, and the MRF is one as well. It’s more than just a 
levy that goes into a government bank account that can be used to fund projects that are 
mining rehabilitation projects… it’s more complex and nuanced than that.’: M8. 
484 M6, M8. 
485 M8. 
486 M3, M6, M8. One interviewee described UPBs as a ‘blunt yet effective’ tool: M8. 
487 M3, M6, M8. 
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Operators now have responsibility for determining and implementing an 
appropriate environmental outcome, which means that greater responsibility has 
been placed on the industry, as intended by the government in their move towards 
risk-based regulation. 488  This is consistent with the DMP’s ability to spread 
obligations across the entire industry by increasing levy rates or payments. 
The data gathered through reporting under the MRF was perceived by 
interviewees as a useful tool to assist DMP inspectors in developing their 
monitoring and inspection program.489 The Auditor General’s 2014 Report found 
that the data captured because of the MRF had resulted in ‘greater clarity and 
better recording of the inspection process’, which in turn contributed to the 
DMP’s ability to address the previously recognised issues with inspection and 
compliance monitoring. 490  Furthermore, the automated nature of the EARS2 
reporting system means that instances of non-lodgement are flagged immediately. 
The RLE for each tenement assists the DMP in identifying and targeting features 
with increased risk, 491  which will have the most critical impact on the 
rehabilitation liability if a site is abandoned. This assisted the State with its move 
from a prescriptive towards a risk-based regulatory framework, where operators 
manage their own risks.492 
Overall, the DMP’s ability to track compliance with the conditions it places on 
mine sites has been greatly improved, and has resulted in a greater capacity to 
assess whether conditions placed on mines are being met.  
(i) Enforcing Rehabilitation Obligations 
Interviewees discussed the various methods by which operators might avoid their 
environmental obligations, particularly considering the Ellendale scenario, which 
suggested that this could be done relatively easily. They emphasised that while 
                                                 
488 Explanatory Memorandum, Mining Legislation Amendment Bill 2013 (WA). 
489 M4, M6, M8. 
490 Office of the Auditor General Western Australia, above n 127, 17. 
491 One interviewee suggested that if a mine with a large RLE is approaching closure, and the 
AER and MRF data are both indicating that no progressive rehabilitation has been performed, 
the mine may be considered higher risk. The DMP may use their powers under the Mining Act 
to require more frequent inspections and mine closure plans than the usual three years, with 
sites determined to have higher risk being inspected annually: M6. 
492 Explanatory Memorandum, Mining Legislation Amendment Bill 2013 (WA). 
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the MRF exists to assist where unplanned mine closure occurs, it is not designed 
to prevent such instances.493 
Areas of concern included the use of care and maintenance, tenement sales, and 
the restructuring or administration of companies. Interviewees then discussed 
potential remedies. These were broadly split between better enforcement of 
existing legislation, and the need for legislative change, with the latter including 
the role of directors, and the Queensland’s Chain of Responsibility model.494 
For mines under the Mining Act, in instances of unexpected closure, there is a 
requirement for a decommissioning plan to be drafted, and a review of the mine 
closure plan within three months of abandonment.495 Significantly, an operator 
may be bound by rehabilitation obligations even after they relinquish the 
tenement,496 although no new obligations can be added by the regulator.497 
(ii) Care and Maintenance 
In recent years, falls in commodity prices and the economic downturn have seen a 
large number of mines being placed into care and maintenance.498 As of March 
2016, this included 64 mining projects which have entered the MRF, had their 
bonds returned, and have subsequently been put into care and maintenance.499 
Care and maintenance occurs when a change in circumstances makes production 
                                                 
493 M2, M8. ‘It certainly shouldn’t be a solution of first resort – but it was good to have it then’: 
M8. 
494 See above Chapter II(C)(1). 
495 Mines Safety and Inspection Act (WA) ss 24, 88. 
496 Mining Act 1978 (WA) s 114B. 
497 Tony Van Merwyk and Fiona Collin, ‘Avoiding the pitfalls: A legal perspective on 
successfully navigating mine closure regimes’ [2012] AMPLA Yearbook 613, 615. 
498 Michael Pascoe, ‘Fortescue Metals Group rumoured to be reviewing possible Cloudbreak mine 
closure’, Sydney Morning Herald (online) 27 November 2014 
<http://www.smh.com.au/business/mining-and-resources/fortescue-metals-group-rumoured-to-
be-reviewing-possible-cloudbreak-mine-closure-20141127-11vjbm.html>; Tess Ingram and 
Julie-anne Sprague, ‘Iron ore carnage: West Australian mines could close by July’, Sydney 
Morning Herald (online) 7 March 2015 <http://www.smh.com.au/business/mining-and-
resources/iron-ore-carnage-west-australian-mines-could-close-by-july-20150306-
13x1ix.html>. 
499 Western Australia, Legislative Council, 22 March 2016, 1534-1535 (Ken Baston).  
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no longer economically viable, 500  and is usually chosen over mine closure 
because it retains the potential to mine if conditions improve in future. 
Interviewees identified the use of long-term care and maintenance as a tactic that 
some operators could use to delay or avoid rehabilitation obligations, a finding 
replicated by the Queensland Audit Office,501 and Lamb suggests,502 sites on care 
and maintenance may ‘present a higher risk’ to the State.503 
The rehabilitation obligations and licence requirements for a mine on care and 
maintenance are no different to an operating mine, and include continued 
contributions to the MRF. Sites on which operations have been suspended must 
submit a Care and Maintenance Plan, 504  and the ongoing environmental 
management whilst a site is on care and maintenance needs to be reported in the 
AER.505 
To interviewees, the MRF did not deter use of care and maintenance.506  The 
requirement to pay the MRF would be perceived as just another cost of putting a 
mine on care and maintenance, and the impost was too low to affect behaviour.507 
This was particularly the case as future technology improvements or sale might 
mean that a site could returns to economic viability, or where different minerals 
co-exist, and restarting from a position of unrehabilitated care and maintenance 
would be less costly.508 
                                                 
500 Care and maintenance is defined by the Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA) and 
Environmental Protection Authority (WA) as ‘The phase following temporary cessation of 
mining operations where infrastructure remains intact and the site continues to be managed. 
All mining operations are suspended, and the site is maintained and monitored: Department of 
Mines and Petroleum (WA) and Environmental Protection Authority (WA), above n 81, 45. 
501 Queensland Audit Office, above n 429, 45. 
502 Lamb, Erskine and Fletcher, above n 430, 191. 
503 The increased risk was identified as a result of ‘fewer operator personnel on site to maintain 
vital infrastructure and monitor performance,’ and the resulting decrease in the visibility of the 
site to the Department of Environment and Heritage Protection and the Department of Natural 
Resources and Mines: Queensland Audit Office, above n 147, 30. 
504 Mine Safety and Inspection Act 1994 (WA) s 88. 
505 Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA) and Environmental Protection Authority (WA), 
above n 81, 10. 
506 M1, M3. 
507 ‘[Y]ou spend more money pumping water out of an underground operation than you would on 
[the] MRF… even caretakers’ costs would be greater.’: Anonymous.  
508 M5, M7. 
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One interviewee proposed policy change to motivate rehabilitation of these 
mines, such as a gradual increase in the MRF levy, the longer a site is on care and 
maintenance, or limiting the period a site can be in care and maintenance.509 Such 
a policy was also suggested by the New South Wales Audit Office.510 
(iii) Tenement Sales 
Tenement sales was identified as the prevalent way of operators avoiding their 
rehabilitation obligations, often following a period of care and maintenance.511 A 
common scenario identified was the sale of end-of-life assets, often for minimal 
consideration, to smaller operators, who would extract any remaining resource, 
but lacked the capacity to rehabilitate, referred to by an interviewee as ‘closure by 
stealth’. 512  This trend has been widely noticed by the media and academics 
alike.513 
In such cases, due to the possibility of future mining, minimal rehabilitation 
would occur prior to the sale, with one interviewee admitting: ‘[M]ine closure 
plans were done from a compliance perspective and to know what our liability is. 
We’re never going to do what is in the mine closure plan, because we’re going to 
sell it’.514  
Interviewees noted that the MRF was not intended to impact such behaviour. 
Instead, they emphasised the importance of other mechanisms available to the 
State, principally the enforcement of mine closure plans, or enforcing additional 
requirements as a condition of transfer.  
                                                 
509 Lamb, Erskine and Fletcher, above n 430, 191. 
510 New South Wales Audit Office, above n 160, 4. 
511 ‘Care and maintenance is just someone sitting on an asset until the price improves for 
themselves, or they can flip it at the right time. A mine that is put onto care and maintenance 
will normally be up for sale not long afterwards. Because ultimately if it’s not economic to 
mine, then the big cost is ultimate closure. So they’re trying to pass that on to someone else.’: 
M5. 
512 ‘… closure by stealth where mine go to care and maintenance… they change hands a few 
times and ultimately whoever is left holding it holds all the environmental responsibilities 
despite the fact they didn't actually do the mining’: M4. 




One raised the recent example of Blair Athol, a coal mine in Queensland, which 
Rio Tinto sold for a dollar,515 amid media reports that the rehabilitation liability 
was substantially understated.516 However, the Queensland government refused to 
allow the transfer without Rio Tinto providing substantial guarantees over the 
rehabilitation liability. The sale allowed Rio Tinto to remove the liability from 
their balance sheet, and instead disclose it as a contingent liability, 517  while 
ensuring the Queensland government retained adequate financial assurance. This 
is possible in WA as the transfer of a mining lease requires Ministerial approval 
under the Mining Act.518 
(i) Restructuring or Administration  
(iii) Company Restructuring or Administration 
Interviewees associated the most serious occasions of avoidance of rehabilitation 
obligations with the use of the company restructuring or administration options 
under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (‘Corporations Act’). They highlighted the 
possibility to put companies holding significant unfunded rehabilitation 
obligations into administration, thereby allowing those liabilities to revert to the 
State.  
Specifically, a parent company could place its rehabilitation obligations into a 
subsidiary company, and place that in administration, while the parent company 
continued trading, which was what occurred at Ellendale. While UPBs had 
provided an incentive to companies not to place subsidiaries into administration, 
there was no similar incentive under the MRF. As of 2016, four companies to 
                                                 
515 TerraCom Limited, Completion of Blair Athol Acquisition ASX Announcement, 31 May 2017 
<http://terracomresources.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/1678826.pdf>; Peter Ker, ‘Former 
Rio Tinto executive buys Blair Athol coal mine for $1’ Australian Financial Review (online), 
4 July 2016 <http://www.afr.com/business/mining/former-rio-tinto-executive-buys-blair-athol-
coal-mine-for-1-20160703-gpxsa9>. 
516 Mark Willacy, ‘Rio Tinto's $1 sale of Blair Athol coal mine 'puts risk back on taxpayer’, ABC 
(online), 12 July 2016 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-07-12/rio-tinto-selling-massive-
queensland-coal-mine-for-dollar/7588916>. 
517 This accounting treatment is determined by AASB 137 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and 
Contingent Assets, which requires a provision to be recognised for future obligations that are 
‘probable’. However, those that are only ‘possible’ are not treated as liabilities, but are 
disclosed as contingent liabilities. They are therefore ‘off-balance’ sheet and are not 
recognised as a liability Australian Accounting Standards Board (August 2015), AASB 137 
Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets. 
518 Mining Act 1978 (WA) s 82(1)(d). 
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whom the DMP had returned UPBs had entered administration. 519  In such 
circumstances, rehabilitation often needs to be performed rapidly, and in 
financially constrained circumstances.520 
As the first mine declared an abandoned mine under the MRF Act, Ellendale 
raised the profile of mining securities and mine rehabilitation issues, and 
generated public and media debate. Although the necessary rehabilitation was 
carried out on Ellendale, it highlighted that premature mine closure is likely to 
result in rapidly implemented remedial rehabilitation, rather than a considered 
approach as part of a long-term closure plan.521 Interviewees suggested a range of 
potential solutions to address the matter, discussed below. 
(iv) Enforcement of Environmental Liabilities 
In discussing potential solutions for issues noted above, some interviewees were 
dismissive about the need for reforms. In their perspective, significant progress 
could be made through better monitoring and enforcement of the existing mine 
closure framework.522  
Interviewees observed that since the Minister retains the authority under the 
Mining Act to require UPBs, the State could improve and extend its assessment of 
when bonds are required, through monitoring for warning signs that an operator 
might not meet its obligations.523 These included operators in potential financial 
difficulty, for example, those with unpaid royalties, unpaid rent or MRF levies. It 
could also include missed or poor environmental management because of 
aggressive cost reduction.524 
                                                 
519 Western Australia, Legislative Council, 22 March 2016, 1534-1535 (Ken Baston). 
520 Laurence, above n 301. 
521 Lamb, Erskine and Fletcher, above n 430, 191. 
522 M3, M10. ‘To encourage the right behaviour, it’s audit, compliance and prosecution’: M3. 
523 ‘The State can't just rely on MRF. The State also needs to be looking out for other warning 
signs of financial difficulty which it can then use to minimize the liability that it might be left 
with’: M3. 
524 ‘… when companies are in a bit of financial difficulty, one of the first things they'll do is look 
for cost savings and cost savings are often in areas that are not core to the key production… 
[their] priority is not going to be stopping production. It’s going to be some of the things 
alongside or around stopping production which usually gives rise to more environmental or 
safety risk. And they're the sorts of compliance things that can be some early warning signs 
that a company is in financial difficulty.’: M3. 
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A second area of focus interviewees identified in relation to the DMP was 
compliance monitoring for environmental approvals, including inspections, 
audits, and follow-ups.525 Interviewees identified the need for a change in focus 
by both industry and the State, as the industry transitions from rapid expansion to 
long-term operations, from initial approvals to ongoing compliance.526 Despite an 
existing DMP Enforcement Policy,527 interviewees noted that enforcement action 
on environmental issues was rare and limited.528  
While interviewees considered the introduction of the requirements for mine 
closure plans as a positive action, they agreed that there was a need for greater 
review, enforcement, and monitoring. Interviewees suggested that this would 
consist of both an increase in DMP resources dedicated to inspection and 
auditing, followed by greater use of enforcement notices and prosecutions for 
non-compliance.529 
These interviewees criticised the way that approval conditions and mine closure 
plans were written.530 To them, the approval conditions and mine closure plans 
were often vague and open to interpretation,531 without any specific requirement 
for specific activities to be completed by certain dates.532 As such, it was difficult 
to determine when the rehabilitation responsibility crystallised, or to prove that 
                                                 
525 ‘There needs to be more money and focus on enforcement and compliance through auditors 
and compliance officers, going to companies saying why aren’t you doing this.’: M3. 
526 M1, M3, M8. ‘As we are coming out of a rapid approvals phase where all the money and focus 
has been on approvals, the focus for companies has shifted to managing the approvals, and for 
government enforcing the conditions within the approvals.’: M3. 
527 Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), Enforcement Policy (2015); Department of Mines 
and Petroleum (WA), Prosecution Guidelines (2015). 
528 M1, M3, M4, M5. 
529 M1, M3, M4, M5. 
530 M1, M3, M4, M5.  
531 ‘How do you write the conditions on the approvals. Rather than just saying, “the company 
shall rehabilitate progressively”. What does that mean?’: M1.  
532 ‘[Y]ou have these mine closure plans... they’re glossy brochures that you’ve done up… They 
sit on the shelf and they’re not actively applied.’: Anonymous. 
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conditions had not been met. 533  Without a benchmark against which to hold 
operators accountable, enforcement activity was difficult.534 
One interviewee backed the need for a robust review of mine closure plans, rather 
than a ‘box-ticking’ approach. 535  Others added that it should not be left a 
company’s sense of corporate social responsibility, they felt it was currently.536 
The interviewee asserted that an annual reporting on progress against the mine 
closure plan should be mandatory, and subject to audit by the DMP to ascertain 
that sufficient progress is being made. 537  ‘Until there is real incentive, the 
government comes down harder… I just don’t think the corporate social 
responsibility piece is big enough’,538 one interviewee commented. 
Some interviewees noted that an increase in prosecutions would be the most 
effective method of improving mining company management boards’ attention on 
environmental obligations, and the DMP previously had neither the funding nor 
the disposition to take action in this area.539 However, some interviewees pointed 
out that imprisoning or penalising directors would not benefit the State, and 
instead, any penalties should focus on financial repercussions, such as shutting 
down operations, or withholding approvals.540  
As Ward contends, there are inherent limitations of rehabilitation obligations 
within the WA environmental compliance framework.541 While operators remain 
                                                 
533 M1, M3. ‘That goes then goes back to writing the approvals properly and having clear 
conditions that are easy to prove in court’: M3. 
534 ‘Our mine closure plans are you know… we’ll tip a couple of bits here and we’ll do this. And 
that’s our mine closure plan. Well whose fault is that? It’s the regulator… for approving that 
mine closure plan.’: Anonymous. 
535 M3. 
536 M1, M4, M5, M10. 
537 M3, M5, M6, M8. ‘[Referring to progression towards mine closure plans]… there might be in 
the corporate social responsibility side of things. Some companies might voluntarily do that, 
but there's nothing from a statutory point of view or from a regulator point of view that 
requires you to report against those.’: M5. 
538 M1. 
539 ‘The DMP doesn’t prosecute because they never had the money… it costs money to prosecute, 
to have inspectors to collect the evidence, run the prosecutions’: M3. 
540 M1, M5. Interviewees attributed this to the difficulty in identifying a victim of environmental 
harm, and noted that enforcement activities were often restricted to warning letters and adverse 
findings. 
541 Ward, above n 300, 468. 
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liable for rehabilitation after tenement relinquishment, 542  there has been no 
reported instance where it has been applied,543 and as interviewees pointed out, in 
scenarios of operator insolvency, any enforcement action would be pointless. This 
was evident in the recent example of previously Indian-owned, Griffin Coal mine 
in WA’s South-West entering voluntary administration, where no Australian 
entity remains to be held liable for rehabilitation. 544  
(c) Legislative Reform 
While several interviewees commented on the need for increased enforcement of 
existing legislation, there was also a frequently expressed view among some of 
the need for legislative change. Given the complexity of implementing a system 
like the MRF, interviewees saw legislative obligation as the only way to ensure 
compliance.545 
Many interviewees argued that reforms with a financial or legal impact were 
required to manage a non-compliant minority,546 with one asserting, ‘[N]o board 
is going to accept fines and defending as a cost of business. Vigorous 
enforcement should weed out most. You’ll still get ones who are recalcitrant 
regardless, but for most of industry, it is reputation’. 547 
The concept of corporate social responsibility and reputational risk was perceived 
to only impact behaviour among the largest miners,548 with minimal effect among 
smaller entities. For this reason, interviewees argued the DMP required stronger 
powers to enforce environmental responsibilities on culpable third parties such as 
directors, or parent companies who undertake restructuring to avoid rehabilitation 
                                                 
542 Mining Act 1978 (WA) s 114B. 
543 Ward, above n 300, 464. 
544 Griffin Coal was owned by Lanco Infratech Limited, a company based in India. 
545 ‘It needs to be a legislation change. Compliance with legislation requires effort, time, money, 
[which a] company won’t do voluntarily. Because you want to be compliant with the 
legislation you need… to track it, map out exactly, that’s all costs. Legislation such as the 
MRF was complicated to implement and work out... it involved fly-overs and people to work 
out how much clearing and within the financial year to work out how much to pay. A company 
is not going to send people out to record all of that voluntarily. They might do some, but not 
all.’: Anonymous. 
546 M1, M3, M5, M10. 
547  M3. 
548  ‘It might tick some good corporate social responsibility items but… there needs to be better 
incentive for companies to rehabilitate.’: M1. 
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obligations. This was consistent with findings by Truscott, Bartlett and Tywoniak, 
who noted that operators often make ‘token efforts which lack substance and are 
designed to generate favourable publicity’. 549  Trebeck further suggested that 
corporate social responsibility efforts were often targeted more at achieving a 
positive corporate image, and protecting their ‘social licence to operate’, rather 
than any genuine long-term outcomes.550 
There were multiple suggestions as to areas where legislative change could focus. 
Directors’ responsibilities under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (‘Corporations 
Act’) was a common theme for interviewees, and some expanded on this to 
discuss the role that statutory guarantees could play. Other interviewees focused 
on the limits of the State’s power under the Mining Act and Environmental 
Protection Act 1986 (WA) (‘EP Act’), or considered the Chain of Responsibility 
model recently adopted in Queensland. 
However, those interviewees who suggested the need for legislative change noted 
the need for moderation. Any changes had to balance the improvement of 
environmental outcomes with the need to avoid onerous or draconian restrictions 
on the industry or its directors.551 
(i) Directors’ Responsibility 
The Ellendale scenario provoked discussion among interviewees about the 
limitations of the Corporations Act and the role of the directors. Ellendale 
exemplified the ease for a company to walk away from obligations through sale, 
restructuring or liquidation, thereby voiding rehabilitation liabilities.  
Directors seeking to take advantage of the system could postpone rehabilitation 
indefinitely. One interviewee theorised that the directors could place the company 
into administration, and the appointed liquidator could disclaim the onerous asset, 
                                                 
549 Rachel Truscott, Jennifer Bartlett, and Stephane Tywoniak, ‘The reputation of the corporate 
social responsibility industry in Australia’ (2009) 17(2) Australasian Marketing Journal 84, 
88.  
550 Katherine Trebeck, ‘Exploring the responsiveness of companies: Corporate social 




thereby avoiding rehabilitation obligations.552 Hence, interviewees attributed any 
deficiencies to the Corporations Act, and not the MRF legislation.553 
Ellendale reinforced the risk to the State of the reduced financial assurance 
following the return of bonds. Without a bond at risk, the director’s primary 
incentive, and indeed their responsibility under the Corporations Act, was to act 
in the best interests of the corporation.554 This could be perceived as directly 
contradictory to the interests of the State government and the environment. In 
particular, the requirement to be able to pay debts when they become due and 
payable, 555  and to prevent insolvent trading, 556  applies only to financial 
liabilities557, not environmental obligations, which could therefore be repudiated 
by voluntary administration. This change would mean that the directors could be 
held personally liable for environmental obligations, if they traded insolvently. 
An interviewee thought this could perhaps be addressed by extending the 
definition of creditors in the Corporations Act to cover environmental 
obligations. 558 However, interviewees acknowledged that a change in the 
Corporations Act would have profound effects beyond the mining sector.559 
To several, the absence of any personal responsibility was an issue. 560  Some 
suggested this could be mitigated by amending Mining Act to make executive 
officers potentially liable for the offences of the corporation, particularly the 
requirement for rehabilitation.561  
                                                 
552 M8, M9. 
553 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 568. 
554 Ibid s 181. 
555 Ibid s 95A. 
556 Ibid s 588G. 
557 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 588G applies only to instances where a debt is incurred.  Since 
a rehabilitation is not owed to any particular individual, it does not fall under the definition of 
a debt. 
558 ‘… how companies account for their liabilities currently and in the future, there is no standard 
way that they have to do that under the Corporations Act.’: M6. 
559 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 588G. 
560 M8. 
561 Interviewees referred specifically to the Contaminated Sites Act 2003 (WA), and the 
Environmental Protection Act 1986 (WA). 
79 
 
Interviewees also acknowledged the practical difficulties in enforcing personal 
liability for directors against foreign nationals, or those with overseas assets, and 
that it may not result in any significant funds being recovered to address 
rehabilitation liabilities. 562  Ward also highlighted the difficulties of pursuing 
directors or group companies for rehabilitation obligations, due to the limited 
circumstances in which associated group companies can be held liable, and 
because directors ‘may be dead, bankrupt, or unable to be located.’ 563  An 
interviewee who was also a company director, expressed concern of being an 
‘easy target’,564 as the only remaining party with assets onshore. 
Consequently, there was little enthusiasm for amending the Corporations Act,565 
with an interviewee noting that it would strongly deter individuals from seeking 
company board positions,566 and would result in significantly increased Directors 
and Officers (D&O) insurance costs.567 Furthermore, any attempt to remove the 
benefit of incorporation would have risked making the MRF as a replacement 
mining security system politically unpalatable to the industry.568 
This was reflected in WA’s submission to the Senate Inquiry,569 which noted the 
risk nationally, and that action would need to occur at the Commonwealth level. 
The ability of a liquidator to disclaim onerous property under the Corporations 
Act limits the State’s capacity to minimise its exposure to the rehabilitation 
                                                 
562 M5, M8, 
563  Clare Ward, ‘Miners’ liability to redress reduced water quantity and quality after mine site 
closure: A case study of the Collie Coalfields in Western Australia’ (2015) 32 Environmental 
and Planning Law Journal 455, 475. 
564 ‘As a director of the Australian company… so I get a little defensive about and protective of 
my own personal assets. Because I’m the easy target… Would it be shared equally among the 
directors? No. They’d go for the easy target that’s based in the State.’: Anonymous. 
565 M4, M8. ‘There shouldn’t be, and there won’t be amendments to the Corporations Act. They 
could fix it within the mine closure and environmental framework. The corporations law 
applies to all corporations.’: M4.  
566 This could be considered to be contrary to Evaluation Principle 1. 
567 M9. 
568 ‘The MRF legislation falls short of making directors liable - that may have been. You have to 
do things incrementally. And while the package as it was, was palatable, the package plus 
director's liability may very well not have been.’ M8. 
569 Western Australian Government, Submission No 44 to Senate Standing Committee on 
Environment and Communications References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry 
into the Rehabilitation of Mining and Resources Projects as it relates to Commonwealth 
Responsibilities, 13 April 2017. 
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liability on the tenement, since the Corporations Act prevails over the Mining 
Act. 570  Remedies suggested included holding liquidators responsible, 571  or 
ensuring that provisions recognised for environmental costs are treated similarly 
to creditors.572 
(ii) Statutory Guarantees on Directors 
Expanding on the issue of directors’ responsibilities, some interviewees 
considered the case for the imposition of statutory guarantees on directors, whose 
decisions are responsible for creating a disturbance. They noted that this could be 
implemented through the Mining Act.573 
However, this was not a popular approach. Some interviewees believed it would 
be a deterrent mining development, and would make the role of director of a 
mining company unacceptably risky, resulting in significant industry protest.574 It 
would also significantly increase the cost of D&O Liability Insurance.575 
Another interviewee noted that any attempt on the State’s part to claim against 
individual directors was unlikely to be effective. In the case of a project in 
financial difficulty, directors may also be experiencing financial stress, or may be 
located overseas, resulting in a low probability of recovering significant assets, 
whereas bank guarantees offered the government prompt access to funds.576 
It was acknowledged that the MRF itself was not intended to prevent poor 
corporate behaviour, or directors who repudiate their responsibilities. Instead, it 
gave the State a level of risk mitigation when it occurred, 577  and it was 
considerably easier to access funds compared to other systems that required 
                                                 
570 Sections 5G(4) and (11) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) allow the priority of State laws 
over the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) provisions where there is a direct inconsistency. 
571 M6. 
572 Western Australian Government, Submission No 44 to Senate Standing Committee on 
Environment and Communications References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry 
into the Rehabilitation of Mining and Resources Projects as it relates to Commonwealth 
Responsibilities, 13 April 2017. 
573 M5, M9. 
574 M5, M9. Although one interviewee suggested that ‘… the people who would complain most 






tracing such as the Chain of Responsibility model and Contaminated Sites Act 
2003 (WA) (‘Contaminated Sites Act’).578 
One interviewee noted that a similar system already existed in respect of the 
Contaminated Sites Act, 579  and conceded that such a system was a ‘good 
preventative measure’. 580  However, another argued that apart from the 
complexities associated with tracing, the effect of the Contaminated Sites Act was 
to go after the deepest pockets, rather than those that were the most 
responsible.581 
(iii) The Chain of Responsibility Model 
Some interviewees highlighted that WA could consider Queensland’s Chain of 
Responsibility concept. 582  An interviewee noted that recently the Queensland 
government used the Chain of Responsibility to require Linc Energy’s major 
shareholder to undertake decommissioning work, and provide a $5.5 million bank 
guarantee against costs.583 
The interviewee also referred to the Linc Energy Case, 584  which attained 
‘effectively the opposite result of Ellendale’, 585  by finding that State laws 
prevailed over the Corporations Act in the case of inconsistency, which 
                                                 
578 M3, M4. 
579 Although as interviewees pointed out, the Contaminated Sites Act 2003 (WA) is limited to the 
area of contamination only. 
580 M3: ‘It’s good because it scares people when I advise them on it, so it’s a preventative 
measure’. 
581 M7. 
582 The Environmental Protection (Chain of Responsibility) Amendment Act 2016 (Qld) amended 
the Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld) which empowered the State to extend 
responsibility for the costs of mining rehabilitation to a ‘related person’. See above Chapter 
II(C)(1) for a description of the Chain of Responsibility concept. 
583 Mark Willacy, ‘Former Linc Energy head ordered to clean up site of controversial gas project’, 
ABC (online), 26 May 2016 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-05-26/former-linc-energy-
head-ordered-to-clean-up-site-of-gas-project/7448588>. 
584 Linc Energy Ltd (in Liq): Longley & Ors v Chief Executive Dept of Environment & Heritage 
Protection (‘Linc Energy Case’) (2017) 318 FLR 262. Jackson J found that sub-sections 5G(4) 
and (11) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) prioritise State laws over the provisions of the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) where a direct inconsistency exists. The pre-existing Queensland 
environmental laws have priority over the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) disclaimer provisions, 





effectively rendered impossible the liquidator’s disclaiming of environmental 
liabilities.  
However, the prevailing view among interviewees was that the Chain of 
Responsibility requirements were too onerous, and that effort was better spent in 
bolstering the DMP’s enforcement and investigation powers, and ensuring that 
robust penalties for non-compliance were in place. 586  One described it as 
‘horrendous’,587 and another as ‘difficult to enforce’588 due to the ability of a 
director to distance themselves from the operation, or because the chain would 
often end with a company in administration.  
Some interviewees highlighted perceived deficiencies in the Mining Act,589 with 
one commenting on the lack of offences within it,590 limiting the DMP’s capacity 
to issue fines or impose forfeiture for non-compliance with tenement conditions. 
Additionally, as noted by Ward,591 forfeiture was not an effective sanction against 
land with rehabilitation obligations, since there was no enforcement mechanism 
after a tenement was surrendered.592 
 (iv) The Balancing Act as a Regulator 
Interviewees acknowledged the need for legislation to balance environmental 
compliance without discouraging mining activity, and its associated economic 
benefits.593 The regulator’s longstanding role as ‘guardians of the environment for 
future generations,’ on whom the public rely, inevitably created a tension against 
a mining company’s focus on short-term benefits and profits.594  
                                                 
586 M3, M4, M5, M9.  
587 M3. 
588 M9. 
589 M3, M4, M8. 
590 M4. 
591 Ward, above n 300, 464. 
592 Mining Act 1978 (WA) s 114B; Van Merwyk and Collin, above n 497, 615. 
593 M3, M6, M9. ‘Governments want the economic benefit of having the mining operation, and 
the community wants jobs…but it must be balanced against the risk... and that’s not unique to 
mining.’: M6. 
594  M3. 
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Interviewees stressed that the focus was mainly on a minority of unethical or non-
compliant miners, 595  with the risks generally being greater among smaller 
operators, who were looking for quick returns. 596  One commented ‘those are 
precisely the people who need a bespoke mine closure plan and who the State 
requires some security around, because… they’re going to over-extend and 
they’re going to not have any [funds] left over for rehab[ilitation]’.597 
Interviewees recognised the need to balance the interests of shareholders against 
those of the State and the public, and the need for balance was also recognised by 
McLeod.598 Financial assurance regimes for mine rehabilitation and closure are 
difficult to get right due to the fine line between implementing adequate 
regulation and discouraging investment. It is likely that regulatory change will 
continue to occur in this space until an appropriate balance is struck. 
One interview asserted that, in granting approval to mining operations, the State 
accepts that there would inevitably be some environmental impact, and the State’s 
role is to manage risk rather than to eliminate it, by ensuring that activity is 
environmentally sustainable.599 Therefore, the State’s role is to monitor, identify 
warning signs, enforce compliance, in order to ‘ensure economic activity is 
happening in a socially acceptable way’.600 
 (d) Concluding Remarks 
Overall, interviewees considered the technical barriers to progressive 
rehabilitation to substantially exceed any incentives the MRF could deliver. Like 
Gorey et al, 601 interviewees observed that, while the MRF was not introduced as 
a comprehensive solution to all mine closure and rehabilitation issues, it was a 
mechanism that could assist in achieving positive environmental outcomes, when 
considered within the broader environmental framework.  
                                                 
595 M3, M9. ’90 per cent of the industry do the right thing… But the focus is managing miners 
who wind up not being good corporate citizens’: M9. 
596 ‘… a lot of small guys just want to get on the ground, dig it up, and get a cash flow’: M9. 
597 M9. 
598 McLeod, above n 26. 
599 M2. 
600 M2. 
601 Gorey et al, above n 40, 379. 
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Interviewees reemphasised the MRF’s primary objective, of providing the State 
with a pool of funds for abandoned sites, and therefore concluded that it was 
intended as an economic mechanism rather than a compliance one, 602  being 
effectively an insurance policy for the State if other regulatory measures failed. 
Rehabilitation and long-term site management was primarily regulated through 
other legislation in the wider mine closure and environmental framework, EP Act, 
and tenement and licence conditions imposed, with compliance being achieved 
through DMP inspection and audit, 603  rather than through the MRF. This 
contrasted with the State government, which had indicated that the MRF also had 
environmental objectives.  
The introduction of the MRF was supplemented by an ‘enhanced compliance 
system’ 604  to encourage progressive rehabilitation. However, Gorey et al 
emphasised that the DMP’s approach was to ensure that scope of the reform 
remained relatively small and achievable, with more politically challenging 
elements, such as the management of State Agreements, being deferred for later 
consideration.605  
Nevertheless, interviewees recognised a compliance element resulting from the 
implementation of the MRF, both in encouraging a lower footprint, and in 
providing improved data for the DMP. However, the compliance function of the 
MRF was limited, and did not address mine closure or the risk of abandonment. 
Therefore, interviewees generally supported a greater use of UPBs to incentivise 
compliance.  
The consensus was that the ongoing issues with compliance, including the lack of 
progressive rehabilitation, tenement sales to small operators, and over-use of care 
and maintenance, were at best, secondary objectives of the MRF. Interviewees 
believed that the primary solution to these issues was likely to be more robust 
enforcement of the existing mine closure framework, although this needed to be 
implemented cautiously to avoid damaging the industry. Interviewees also saw a 
basis for some legislative reform, particularly in the event of insolvency, both to 
                                                 
602 M3. 
603 M2, M3, M6, M8. 
604 Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), above n 31, 12. 
605 Gorey et al, above n 40, 379. 
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the status of the environment as a creditor, and the ability for the State to extend 
responsibilities to third parties. 
Sustainable development requires the mining industry to balance social, economic 
and environmental interests. 606  Interviewees recognised the need to balance 
competing interests and achieve a politically acceptable solution. The MRF’s 
development in consultation with industry stakeholders was seen as part of its 
success. A complete overhaul of the framework would struggle to gain 
acceptance, whereas the limited scope of the MRF could deliver majority of the 
desired environmental outcomes.607  
  
                                                 
606 Brueckner et al, above n 198. 
607 Gorey et al, above n 40, 379. 
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V    CONCLUSION  
The previous system of mining securities, based on Unconditional Performance 
Bonds (‘UPBs’), was widely acknowledged as grossly inadequate compared to 
the associated rehabilitation liabilities. Given this, and the inadequacies in the 
reporting of disturbance data 608  and environmental compliance 609  to the 
Department of Mines and Petroleum (‘DMP’), the case for change was 
unarguable.  
The empirical research of this thesis has analysed whether the Mining 
Rehabilitation Fund (‘MRF’) was the appropriate vehicle with which to 
implement that change, and how its consequences, both predicted and unforeseen, 
compare to the original objectives of the legislation. 
Evaluated against the principal objective of the legislation, being the 
establishment of a pool of funding for the rehabilitation of abandoned and legacy 
mine sites, the MRF should be considered a success. It has been largely, although 
not entirely successful in meeting the DMP’s Evaluation Principles. 610  Any 
deficiencies were largely anticipated at the outset,611 reflective that the policy was 
designed to favour certain objectives over others.  
The MRF’s nature as a special purpose fund has taken the immediate financial 
obligation for rehabilitation work away from general State revenue, and given the 
State a greater ability to act rapidly and decisively when needed. 612  It has 
provided a capital injection into the resources industry at a time when it was most 
needed, 613  and has also been relatively straightforward to implement and 
administer, for the DMP and the mining industry.614 
Interviewees’ reservations about the MRF’s ability to meet its principal objective 
centred on the size of the Fund, which has grown more slowly than initially 
anticipated. However, the MRF was intended, and should be considered, a long-
                                                 
608 Auditor General Western Australia, above n 3, 19. 
609 Ibid 24. 
610 See Appendix A for an excerpt of the Evaluation Principles, including the Principal Objective. 
611 Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), above n 31, 12. 
612 Evaluation Principle 3. 
613 Evaluation Principle 1. 
614 Evaluation Principles 3 and 5. 
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term system which may require decades to grow to a size that allows it to 
appropriately rehabilitate all the State’s abandoned mines and legacy sites. 
Concern about the Fund’s size may also reflect a common misplaced expectation 
that the MRF will immediately rehabilitate any abandoned mine, rather than the 
more likely approach of site maintenance to prepare for a tenement sale, as seen 
with Ellendale. However, given the finite nature of mineral resources, the MRF 
will need to accumulate rapidly enough to meet rehabilitation needs, together with 
further incremental policy improvements.  
Observations raised by interviewees about the size and growth of the MRF are 
also reflective of its key weakness – the non-inclusion of State Agreement 
operations in the system. This is a significant deficiency given that State 
Agreement operations tend to be major projects, which inevitably have the most 
significant rehabilitation obligations, and therefore the largest source of unfunded 
liability to the State. Allowing State Agreements to sit outside the scope of the 
MRF, and, in most cases, having no requirement for UPBs, appears excessively 
generous to State Agreement mines, and deprives the MRF of a potential source 
of funds.  
The argument that State Agreement mines do not require inclusion as the size of 
their operators results in a very low risk of abandonment does not appear valid.615 
Not only has there been a recent case of a State Agreement operator, Griffin Coal 
entering administration, but there is also the frequently noted issue of projects 
being sold to smaller operators as they near the end of their mine life.  
The MRF legislation has already been drafted in such a way to allow the MRF’s 
extension to State Agreement mines in future, and therefore the difficulty in 
bringing State Agreement mines into the MRF appears to be primarily political 
rather than legal. However, a two-tier system for mining securities appears to be 
inequitable, and the case for change in this area is overwhelming. 
The issue of end-of-life mine tenement sales also raises the question of whether 
the financial assurance provided by the MRF is sufficient by itself. While it may 
be adequate to provide overall financial assurance for the State, the introduction 
of the MRF instead of UPBs has introduced a greater element of moral hazard 
                                                 
615 Evaluation Principle 4. 
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into the mining securities system, as the financial incentive to complete 
rehabilitation work is no longer present, and the cost is borne by the industry, not 
the individual company. 
Ellendale may have demonstrated that WA has progressed too hastily in returning 
UPBs to all but a very few operators. The policy review underway in Queensland 
also reflects this conclusion, and suggests the need for flexibility and optionality 
in dealing with different types of resource projects, through its recommendation 
for a hybrid mining securities system.616 However, the different approaches across 
the various states and territories suggests that no one clear best option exists. 
While any policy needs to reflect a balance of competing stakeholder interests, 
including that of the industry, the State could make greater use of its existing 
authority to require UPBs without disrupting this balance, at least during the 
transitional period while the Fund accumulates. 
As interviewees emphasised, the MRF is not the appropriate tool to address all 
environmental compliance issues. It offers minimal incentive for progressive 
rehabilitation,617 and is weaker than full UPBs in this regard. This is perhaps an 
unavoidable shortcoming of the MRF as a mining security system, as the reality 
of the industry is that progressive rehabilitation often does not make commercial 
sense. The current evidence from Queensland and NSW suggests that a bond 
system would not result in a significantly different outcome. 
Improving mine rehabilitation outcomes will require action both at the State and 
Commonwealth level. Potential reforms include revisiting the Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth), or considering legislation that goes further in holding directors, 
shareholders or associated companies liable for rehabilitation. The treatment of 
rehabilitation liabilities in company liquidation, and the role and responsibilities 
of company directors may require amendment to meaningfully address 
environmental responsibilities.  
At the State level, the nature of State Agreement mines and their exclusion from 
the MRF appears the most significant area compelling reform. There is also scope 
                                                 
616 Queensland Treasury Corporation, above n 153. 
617 Evaluation Principle 2. 
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for the DMP to further expand and refine its monitoring and compliance 
operations.618  
While the MRF may not be a universal solution to all the State’s environmental 
and rehabilitation issues, overall, the evidence presented in this thesis suggests 
that the MRF is a significant improvement to the previous mining securities 
system, and the State government’s ability to fund rehabilitation of mine sites 
should operators not fulfil their rehabilitation obligations.  
                                                 
618 This would enhance the State’s capacity to meet the Principal Objectives, Evaluation 




A    DMP Evaluation of Policy Options 
Evaluation of policy options – Evaluation criteria (excerpt from Western 
Australia's Mining Security System Preferred Option Paper). 619 
The principal objective of mining securities is to ensure that sufficient funds are 
immediately available to government to rehabilitate mine sites in the event of 
operators not fulfilling their mine rehabilitation and closure obligations. 
The suitability of the proposed options was also based on principles listed below: 
1. The quantum of mining securities does not unnecessarily deter investment in 
the State’s mining sector, ensuring Western Australia remains competitive in 
attracting investment to the resources exploration and development sector 
(‘Evaluation Principle 1’).620 
2. Mining securities continue to encourage operators to apply good environmental 
practice, including progressive rehabilitation and reporting, and to comply with 
all legal obligations under the Mining Act 1978 for exploration, mining and mine 
closure (‘Evaluation Principle 2’).  
3. The mining security is secure and immediately accessible by the government, 
and its administration is cost effective (‘Evaluation Principle 3’). 
4. The mining securities framework is clear and workable, and is supported by a 
robust compliance system to ensure operators do not avoid their mine closure 
obligations (‘Evaluation Principle 4’). 
5. The calculation of a mining security is flexible, being commensurate with 
environmental risk (‘Evaluation Principle 5’). 
6. The application and relinquishment processes for mining securities are 
transparent, predictable and applied equitably.621 
  
                                                 
619 Department of Mines and Petroleum (WA), Western Australia's Mining Security System, 
Preferred Option Paper (2011) 12. 
620 For clarity, the Evaluation Principles have been referred throughout the thesis as Evaluation 
Principle 1-5. 
621 Evaluation Principle 6 was not relevant to the MRF, as it relates to the application and 
relinquishment of UPBs. 
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B    Key Legislation Regulating Mining in WA 
Mining Act 1978 (WA) 
Mines Safety and Inspection Act 1994 (WA) 
Environmental Protection Act 1986 (WA) Parts IV and V 
Aboriginal Heritage Act 1972 (WA) 
State Agreement Acts, under Government Agreements Act 1979 (WA) 
Conservation and Land Management Act 1984 (WA) 
Wildlife Conservation Act 1950 (WA) 
Rights in Water and Irrigation Act 1914 (WA) 
Contaminated Sites Act 2003 (WA) 




C    Mining Rehabilitation Fund Rehabilitation Rates 





Description of infrastructure or land Levy rate per 
hectare (unit 
rate) 
A Tailings or residue storage facility (class 1) 
Waste dump or overburden stockpile (class 1) 
Heap or vat leach facility 
Evaporation pond 
Dam – saline water or process liquor 
$50 000 
B Tailings or residue storage facility (class 2) 
Waste dump or overburden stockpile (class 2) 
Low-grade ore stockpile (class 1) 
Plant site 
Fuel storage facility 
Workshop 
Mining void (depth of at least five metres) – 
below ground water level 
Landfill site 
Diversion channel or drain 
Dam – fresh water 
$30 000 
C Low-grade ore stockpile (class 2) 
Sewage pond 
Run-of-mine pad 
Building (other than workshop) or camp site 
Transport or service infrastructure corridor 
Airstrip 
Mining void (depth of at least five metres) – 
above ground water level 
Laydown or hardstand area 
Core yard 
Borrow pit or shallow surface excavation 
(depth of less than five metres) 
Borefield 
Processing equipment or stockpile associated 
$18 000 
                                                 
622 Mining Rehabilitation Fund Regulations 2013 (WA) sch 1. 
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with basic raw material extraction 
Land (other than land under rehabilitation or 
rehabilitated land) that is cleared of vegetation 
and is not otherwise described in this table 
D Land (other than land under rehabilitation or 
rehabilitated land) that has been disturbed by 
exploration operations 
$2 000 
E Land under rehabilitation (other than land that 
has been disturbed by exploration operations) 
Topsoil stockpile 
$2 000 
 Exploration operations: land under 
rehabilitation, rehabilitated land 
No rate 
applicable 




D    Interview Questions 
PROJECT WORKING TITLE: An assessment of whether the Mining 
Rehabilitation Fund in Western Australia has met its objectives, and what 
legislative change, if any, could improve its effectiveness? 
RESEARCHERS: Dr Jo Goodie and Pearl Chong, Murdoch University  
1. What do you believe were the objectives/purpose of the Mining Rehabilitation 
Fund Act 2012 (WA)? 
2. What do you see as the main environmental issues as a result of mining 
operations in Western Australia?   
3. How has this changed since the introduction of the Mining Rehabilitation 
Fund (‘MRF’)?   
4. What benefit(s) has the MRF brought to the industry and society?  
5. Do you think that it has improved compliance with rehabilitation and 
environmental obligations? Why/why not?  
6. What implementation issues have there been with the MRF legislation?  
7. Do you think there are any gaps/loopholes in the law?  
8. How well/not does the MRF address: Planned mine closure and Unplanned 
mine closure? 
9. How could the MRF be changed to better meet its objective to encourage 
rehabilitation?  
10. Is the MRF the appropriate vehicle to encourage rehabilitation, or does it have 
to be addressed through the wider mine closure framework? 
11. How do you think the WA mining securities framework compares to those in 
other Australian States?   
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E    Information Sheet for Participants 
An assessment of whether the Mining Rehabilitation Fund in Western Australia 
has met its objectives, and what legislative change, if any, could improve its 
effectiveness? 
 
Information Sheet for Participants in Research Project 
Introduction 
The aim of our study is to investigate whether there are any implementation 
issues that may have arisen in practice, and whether further legislative or 
regulatory change might be necessary to better achieve the objectives of the 
Mining Rehabilitation Fund (‘MRF’). 
This study aims to use practical observations of legal practitioners gathered 
through interview to contribute to a better understanding of the underlying 
working mechanisms of environmental and rehabilitation requirements in the 
mining industry, and to determine what impact the MRF has had on these. The 
study will be a practical contribution to better understand the role of mining 
rehabilitation legislation in meeting society's environmental objectives for the 
mining industry. 
The research will help us to assess whether the Mining Rehabilitation Fund in 
Western Australia has met its objectives, and what legislative change, if any, 
could improve its effectiveness and to encourage increased focus on progressive 
and quality rehabilitation of mine sites. 
We have contacted you because of your expertise in relation to mining and 
environmental law, and we highly value your input, should you choose to 
participate in this research project.  
This project has been approved by the Murdoch University Human Research 
Ethics Committee (Project No. 2017/034). 
What will I be asked to do? 
Should you agree to participate, you would be asked to contribute by 
participating in an interview of approximately 60 minutes, to get a detailed 
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picture of your experience and understanding of the operation of the Mining 
Rehabilitation Fund and environmental securities in Western Australia.  
With your permission, the interview will be recorded to ensure the research can 
benefit from an accurate record of what you say.  
How will my confidentiality be protected? 
We intend to protect your anonymity and the confidentiality of your responses to 
the fullest possible extent, within the limits of the law. Your name and contact 
details will be kept in a password-protected computer file, separate from any data 
that you supply. Your name and contact details will only be able to be linked to 
your responses by the two researchers named below.  
In the final thesis or any publication that may result, you will be referred to by a 
pseudonym. As, however, only a select sample of lawyers in the area are being 
asked to participate, there is a risk that your identity may be inferred from the 
responses you provide. All efforts will be made to reduce that risk. 
In accordance with Murdoch University guidelines, the data will be kept securely 
in the School of Law for five years from the date of publication before being 
destroyed.  
How will I receive feedback? 
Once the analysis arising from this research has been completed, a brief 
summary of the findings can be forwarded to you. Just let us know via the consent 
form, that you would like to receive the summary. It is also possible that the 
results will be presented at academic conferences, and in academic journals or 
other publications. 
What happens if I want to withdraw? 
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. Should you wish to 
withdraw at any stage during this interview (including before it starts), or to 
withdraw any unprocessed data that you have supplied after the interview has 





Where can I get further information? 
Should you require any further information, or have any concerns, please do not 
hesitate to contact any of the researchers below.  
 
Researchers: 
Dr Jo Goodie 
Senior Lecturer 




Honours Law Student  
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